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In this thesis, I seek to bring together two areas of scholarly work to see how each can inform the 
other: social contract theory and transitional justice. The social contract, as it exists and as it was 
theorized about by Rousseau, was born from the world-historic forces that spread capitalism 
across the globe, stirring up nationalism everywhere it went.  In its wake, there was vast 
inequality and new legal regimes which protected the hoarded wealth of the capitalist class by 
enshrining the right of private property along with life and liberty. To examine the intricacies of 
transitional justice and its mechanisms, I primarily study the examples of Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia.  From these cases there are many examples of transitional justice mechanisms: two 
international criminal tribunals, hybrid courts, truth and reconciliation commissions, special war 
crimes courts, indigenous forms of dispute resolution, lustration, and amnesties. I attempt to 
answer three questions: Why do people commit genocide? What is the social contract under 
transitional justice? Is there a third state of nature? To answer these questions I draw upon a 
diverse body of literature from multiple disciplines. I hope that my approach to these subjects 
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Before the United Nations and the League of Nations, before the Rome statute and the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and before the Bolshevik and French revolutions, 
Immanuel Kant wrote in 1784 that to understand the history of humanity, one must look at it 
from a point of view which stipulates that the ultimate purpose of the human race is to create a 
perfect civic constitution. In his “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant conjectured that historians 
ought to conduct their work with these principles in mind: humankind will fully develop its 
natural capacities through the use of reason, that Nature has willed that humanity will develop its 
natural capacities by evolving beyond its animal instincts, that the natural antagonisms of human 
beings will lead them to create universal civic society governed by law, and that through reason, 
we might be able to discern the ‘secret plan’ which Nature has for us. 
Unfortunately, it is not through reason, at first, that humanity will choose to create a 
universal civic society. In the end, “after devastations, revolutions, and even complete 
exhaustion, [nature] brings [humanity] to that which reason could have told them at the 
beginning and with far less sad experience, to wit, to step from lawless condition of savages into 
a league of nations.”1 Kant goes on to accurately predict that “the impact of any revolution on all 
states on [Europe], so closely knit together through commerce, will be so obvious that the other 
states, driven by their own danger but without any legal basis, will offer themselves as arbiters, 
and thus they will prepare the way for a distant international government for which there is no 
precedent in human history.”2 It is from these words that we can understand both the social 
 
1 Kant, “Idea for a Universal History From a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” 18–19. 
2 Ibid., 23. 
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contract and transitional justice: the movement towards the creation of a perfect civic 
constitution, driven by violent conflict and through fictionalized legal basis.  
In my thesis, I analyze the social contract and transitional justice by the application of 
philosophical, sociological, and political theories to see how each topic can inform the other. I 
believe that my research could inform scholars from multiple areas of academic study — 
philosophers could learn about the real life examples of people writing social contracts and 
political scientists could see how a universalizing approach to understanding human events could 
contextualize transitional justice mechanisms. I begin by sketching out the social contract of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I focus on the emergence from the state of nature and Charles Mills’ 
‘domination contract’ in particular. I go on to take up the real life examples of transitional justice 
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In the final sections  I answer three questions: why do 
people commit genocide, what is the social contract under transitional justice, and could we 
conceive of a third state of nature. I use Claudia Card’s theory of evil, Charles Tilly’s theory of 
contentious politics, and Elizabeth Anderson’s theory of moral progress, among others, to 
answer these questions.  
It may seem out of place to pick the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as the primary 
examples of transitional justice to which social contract theory is applied because mainstream 
academics tend to see contract theory as concerning Western liberal democracies and capitalism. 
The reason I picked my examples is because they offered good contrasts. In the former 
Yugoslavia you have a higher level of industrialization whereas Rwanda is mostly resource 
extraction and agrarian economics. Moreover, Rwanda is a former colony whereas the republics 
of the former Yugoslavia were never colonized. Additionally, these two cases probably more 
than anywhere else had a high density of transitional justice mechanisms. Lastly, I was simply 
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unable to choose a Western capitalist, liberal democracy because there really was no country 
which consciously deployed transitional justice mechanisms. In the best possible cases of 
transitions —  Spain with Franco and Portugal with Salazar — there was no transitional justice 
beyond some lustration and impunity, which is by definition the absence of applied justice.3 It 
might seem natural that the Nuremberg trials would count as an example, but they concern 
crimes committed by a fascist government — hardly an example of government with the consent 
of the governed — and the trials mostly concerned crimes committed outside Germany, against 
the Allied combatants. It was victor's justice. Perhaps the only applicable example I could find 
was in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement, which I briefly discuss at the end.  
This being said, I believe that Rousseau’s account of a class contract and what Mills 
describes as the domination contract is something that could be applied the world over, not just 
Western countries as mainstream contract theorists would have it applied. This is because class 
divisions have existed and domination has happened throughout history and across the world. 
Although the conditions which produced the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant may not be present in many of the areas of the world undergoing transitional 
justice, I believe social contract theory still has import because of Rousseau’s account of what 
really is the social contract. 
  
 
3 On Spain’s lack of transitional justice, see Escudero, “Road to Impunity.” On Portugal’s lack of transitional 
justice, see Raimundo and Pinto, “From Ruptured Transition to Politics of Silence.” 
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1. Social Contract Theory and the Domination Contract 
In the following section I present Rousseau’s account of the social contract. In particular, 
I focus on the concept of emergence from the state of nature and the creation of political authority. 
Additionally, I present what Charles Mills defines as the ‘domination contract.’ I use their theories 
as the baseline for discussing the social contract and transitional justice.  
At the most basic level, social contract theories have both a descriptive and prescriptive 
aspect. All social contract theories seek to describe the nature of human beings, how human nature 
leads individuals to come together to form societies, and the arrangement of political authority that 
tends to take hold in these societies. The prescriptive aspect details which arrangement best orders 
society so as to maximize principles such as liberty, equality, and justice. Modern contractarians 
tend to distinguish a number of contracts within the ‘social contract,’ such as a political contract 
and a moral contract, which outlines the moral codes that regulate behavior within our society. 
Discussions regarding the moral contract tend to focus on the morality of pre-political ‘society’ 
under the state of nature, or at least the proto-society before the creation of political authority, and 
whether or not there are natural laws which prescribe a universal moral code. Some theorists argue 
that the moral codes of the state of nature constrain the reach of the political contract, whereas 
others believe that the political contract creates morality as conventional rules.4  
There is also an epistemological contract, or at least an epistemological aspect to the social 
contract. The epistemological contract can be thought of as “an idealized consensus about 
cognitive norms and... about what counts as a correct, objective interpretation of the world, and 
for agreeing to this view, one is granted full cognitive standing in the polity, the official epistemic 
 
4 Mills, The Racial Contract, 14.  
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community.”5 The social contract creating the official epistemic community is important when 
thinking about ingroups and outgroups.  
We must also consider that social contract theory is not merely a subject of academic 
curiosity, it is a cultural and historical object — something used by political actors to guide 
deliberations and decisions, and even being used to justify policies. Perhaps the very study of the 
social contract has itself changed the course of human development. Regardless, it is a historical 
fact that politicians, military commanders, and other leaders have, at a minimum, invoked the idea 
of the social contract to inspire support for their agendas. Famously, the remains of Rousseau were 
moved to the Panthéon to lay with Voltaire during the French Revolution.6 
We should also distinguish between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Somewhat similar 
to the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive modes of analysis, ideal theory with regards 
to the social contract concerns the theorizing about society under ideal conditions. What might a 
perfect society look like? Non-ideal theory concerns theorizing about society under non-ideal 
conditions. How could an imperfect society be made to look better? Because this thesis seeks to 
explore the intersection of social contract theory and transitional justice, I am concerned with non-
ideal theory.  
Because I am concerned with non-ideal theory, the way that I use the ‘state of nature’ in 
this thesis at times departs from the strict interpretation that is commonly used. Additionally, I 
want to discuss situations where there is not an accepted political authority which guarantees the 
rights and liberties of individuals and moral norms are universally accepted, but there is a level of 
sociability which rises above what most philosophers might consider to be the state of nature. So 
 
5 Ibid., 17-18.  
6 “19 Apotheose de J.J. Rousseau.” 
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by state of nature, I may not always be talking about the strict interpretation, but a somewhat 
broader understanding that I use to answer questions.  
Next, I briefly summarize Rousseau’s accounts of the emergence from the state of nature 
and the establishment of political authority. What is important to understand about Rousseau’s 
theory is that he is offering a conjectural history of human development. He does not attempt to 
present an actual anthropological account. Instead, the point of this conjectural history is to 
explicate why people might forfeit their ‘natural rights’ — rights we hold under the state of nature 
— and accept political authority. Unlike the account of the social contract by Rousseau that I 
present, the emergence from the state of nature and acceptance of political authority, in prescriptive 
theory, is used to justify a political system because people are said to offer the consent of the 
governed. In reality, most people do not consent to their form of government or the arrangement 
of social relations. To paraphrase Marx, we make our own history, but not under circumstances of 
our own choosing.  
At first, individuals are alone, out in the world basically by themselves. Next, there is a sort 
of utopian proto-society as people’s natural inclinations lead to compassion and cooperation. As 
relative levels of inequality rise, jealousy and vainglory overcomes some people, leading to 
conflict and violence. According to Rousseau, “consuming ambition, the zeal for raising the 
relative level of his fortune... inspires in all men a wicked tendency to harm one another” and 
eventually “[t]here arose between the right of the strongest and the right of the first occupant a 
perpetual conflict that ended only in fights and murders. Emerging society gave way to the most 
horrible state of war.”7 At this point there is already a good amount of social cooperation and 
industriousness. This is not quite the state of nature because there is a level of sociability. This 
 
7 Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin of Inequality - Part Two,” 68.  
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interim between the state of nature, where humans are thought to be alone in the world, and the 
state of society under political authority can be considered, or at least I consider, a part of a broad 
interpretation of the state of nature insofar as the rights of individuals are not secured by a 
government and moral norms may not be universally understood and respected. It is here that the 
buds of a future society are planted because of the rise of inequality.  
The need for the creation of the state then comes from a mutual desire to secure one’s 
belongings and persons against the attacks of others. Unlike under Hobbes’ conception, where the 
creation of state is rational and reasonable for all members,8 it is not universally rational, but only 
rational for the rich, and is a ruse perpetrated on the poor. According to Rousseau: 
Alone against all and unable on account of mutual jealousies to unite with his equals against 
enemies united by the common hope of plunder, the rich, pressed by necessity, finally 
conceived the most thought-out project that ever entered the human mind. It was to use in 
his favor the very strength of those who attacked him, to turn his adversaries into his 
defenders, to instill in them other maxims, and to give them other institutions... Such was, 
or should have been, the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters to the weak 
and new forces to the rich, irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, established forever the 
law of property and of inequality, changed adroit usurpation into an irrevocable right, and 
for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected the entire human race to labor, 
servitude and misery. 9   
The reason for Rousseau’s view of the emergence from the state of nature is his belief that the 
current social contract is bad because it is what Charles Mills calls a ‘domination contract.’10 He 
believes that a good contract could be created, which he details in “On the Social Contract,” but 
this subject is not discussed in this thesis. 
 Rousseau is offering a specific type of domination contract. Rather than the social contract 
being a covenant between and among all members of a society, or even representatives for said 
 
8 Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, 54-55.  
9 Ibid., 69-70. 
10 Pateman and Mills, Contract and Domination, 81. 
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members, the social contract is really an agreement between the powerful elites to set the terms of 
how they will rule in society, thereby perpetuating the domination of everyone else. We can think 
of white supremacy as a contract among whites to define whiteness, against all of the other non-
whites in our societies, and in the globe, and then privileging the status of whiteness. We can also 
think of patriarchy as a contract between and among men to define the terms of masculinity and 
femininity and the division of labor so as to perpetuate the domination of women. Rousseau’s 
account is that of a class contract. Before the establishment of political authority, people only had 
a natural right to their property owing to their possession of it. With the emergence from the state 
of nature, the social contract defines the terms of property ownership, creating private property 
and securing the wealth of the powerful elites. Instead of allowing for a true democracy, the  class 
contract allows for control of the state by the wealthy few, and later corporations. It is their consent 
which most politicians elicit, offering only a fig leaf of participation in government to the poor so 
they do not revolt.  
What is most important about Rousseau’s theory is that Rousseau’s emergence from the 
state of nature is achieved in stages and allows for cycles. There are four stages in the emergence 
from the broad interpretation of the state of nature which would unfold over a long period of time. 
The first stage is that of primitive human beings, which is the strict interpretation of the state of 
nature and subsequent stages are merely interim stages. In the second stage, we have the 
beginnings of society with the development of tools, weapons, and language. The third stage is the 
patriarchal stage, where the only ‘political’ authority (not truly political) is the father and the polity 
is the family. The fourth and last stage is the beginnings of inequality, as described earlier, with 
the creation of the domination contract built on class. The transition from the third stage to the 
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fourth stage is what I consider to be the emergence from the (broad interpretation of the) state of 
nature, into a state of society with political authority. 
After the development of civil society, we get three more stages of development, or epochs 
of inequality. In the first epoch, we get the establishment of laws and private property, referred to 
as the rule of the rich over the poor. In the second epoch, we get the creation of magistrates, referred 
to as the rule of the powerful over the weak. In the third and final epoch, the transition of legitimate 
political authority into arbitrary power, which is referred to as the rule of the masters over slaves. 
Under this arbitrary power, we return to a state of nature as our rights are no longer protected, and 
everything is up to the capricious whims of despots. All that can happen next is tyranny, social 
collapse, and/or revolution. So, it must be understood that under Rousseau, there are in fact two 
states of nature. The state of “nature in its purity, and [the second state of nature] is the fruit of an 
excess of corruption.”11 Rousseau is the only theorist who offers an account of a second state of 
nature. This second state of nature is not a traditional, strict interpretation of a state of nature 
because there are extensive social relations; however, Rousseau argues — and I concur with him 
— that this second state of nature ought to be considered a state of nature because the rights and 
liberties of individuals are no longer guaranteed by a political authority and there may not be 
universally understood and respected moral norms. As Rousseau states, “there is so little difference 
between these two states, and the governmental contract is so utterly dissolved by despotism, that 
the despot is master only as long as he is the strongest; and as soon as he can be ousted, he has no 
cause to protest against violence. The uprising that ends in the strangulation or the dethronement 
of a sultan is as lawful an act as”12 his tyrannical decrees of violence. Political authority does exist, 
but because it is tyrannical, there is no guarantee of rights and because there is tyrannical rule, 
 




agents of the state have little accountability to people and may act against any previously 
understood and respected moral norms.  
What is also important about Rousseau’s stages of development and epochs of inequality 
is that his theory points to, or at least allows for, the existence of multiple social contracts over 
time, and not just the Social Contract as postulated by Hobbes, himself, Locke, and Kant. As I 
state from the beginning, Rousseau’s account of humanity’s emergence from the state of nature is 
not to be taken literally, and is rather a conjectural history. As I quote in a larger block, Rousseau 
comments on his account of the stages of development by stating “[s]uch was, or should have been, 
the origin of society and laws.”13 Looking at the actual history of human development, however, 
shows that we have had society and political authority for a long time before the Enlightenment, 
and power was not yet arranged in the fashion described by the likes of Locke, Kant, or Rousseau 
until modernity. As such, we must conclude that there existed what could be understood as a type 
of social contract, even if incomplete. In fact, there were quite literal social contracts that existed 
in feudal society prior to and existing during the Enlightenment. 
According to Silvia Federici, there were extensive feudal social contracts which regulated 
the social relations of European society. These early ‘social contracts’ which made, “ ‘privileges’ 
and ‘charters’ that fixed the burdens and granted” the right for a degree of local self-government, 
while also allowing for the “commutation of labor services with money payments (money rents, 
money taxes) that placed the feudal relation on a more contractual basis.”14 There are additional 
corresponding documents that preceded and contributed to social contract theory. Charles Mills 
points to “papal bulls and other theological pronouncements; European discussions about 
colonialism, ‘discovery,’ and international law; pacts, treaties, and legal decisions... which 
 
13  Ibid., 70. 
14 Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 28. Italics were by the author. 
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collectively can be seen, not just metaphorically, but close to literally, as [the] conceptual, juridical, 
and normative equivalent”15 to the signing of a social contract. Millls’ presentation focuses on the 
relation between white European society and the rest of the non-white world, but I believe that the 
nature of the domination contract entails a degree of application to inter-European affairs. All of 
this is to say that there were social contracts long before the Social Contract as envisioned by the 
Enlightenment, and that Rousseau’s theory best explains how new social contracts arose. During 
times of either war, revolution, or tyranny, there is a devolution into the first or second states of 
nature, as broadly interpreted, from which the eventual resolution of conflict can arise a new social 
contract. This is not to say that a new contract is always obtained — the forces of counterrevolution 
or established powers may succeed. It is only with the Enlightenment that we get the Social 
Contract — the modern social contract.  
The transition from feudalism to capitalism necessitated the modern social contract. 
Starting in the 16th century, going into the 17th century and the Enlightenment, the way that people 
imagined ‘persons’ began to shift away from medieval superstition towards a new paradigm 
involving the Passions and Reason. The body was no longer a plane on which celestial and 
demonic beings did battle, but the “forces of Reason” and instincts of the body (the Passions) 
conflicted. In this process, “a change occurs in the metaphorical field, as the philosophical 
representation of individual psychology borrows images from the body-politics of the state...it is 
an aspect of that broader process of social reformation, whereby”16 the bourgeoisie sought to 
remold the working classes for the growing needs of the emerging capitalist society. 
Out of this, we get the emergence of “Mechanical Philosophy,” as both a product of the 
changing times and a deliberate attempt to shape how the times changed. As Federici argues, 
 
15 Mills, The Racial Contract, 20-21. 
16 Federici., 135.  
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“Mechanical Philosophy contributed to increasing the ruling-class control over the natural world, 
control over human nature being the first, most indispensable step.”17 Mechanical Philosophy, as 
an all encompassing way of understanding the world, could only take root once the old ways of 
conceiving of the world had been destroyed. So, the battle of ‘Reason’ against the psuedo-sciences 
and paranormal or dark arts was not purely an academic exercise or theological campaign for the 
souls of humankind, but a political project — mechanical notions of the body could not take hold 
as “a model of social behavior without the destruction by the state of a vast range of pre-capitalist 
beliefs, practices, and social subjects who existence contradicted the regularization of corporeal 
behavior promised by Mechanical Philosophy.”18 For this reason, paired with Mechanical 
Philosophy, the Age of Reason came also with the revival of philosophical skepticism. Skepticism 
was necessary to get rid of the pre-capitalist beliefs and practices, but its application would extend 
into other areas of philosophy.  
If Mechanical Philosophy guided theories of social control, then it’s important to 
understand the schools of Mechanical Philosophy and which one prevailed. The two main models 
of the body as a machine were the Cartesian model and the Hobbesian model. On the Cartesian 
view, the individual is capable of developing internal mechanisms of discipline and management. 
As such, individuals could voluntarily regulate their own conduct, and interact with government 
based on consent. On the Hobbesian model, people are not capable of self-discipline, and therefore 
a coercive, absolute state was necessary to produce the incentives necessary to make people 
behave. This is because there was no Reason independent of the body, and therefore the body 
could not be trained to act in a different manner than originally intended.  
 
17 Ibid., 140. 
18 Ibid., 141. 
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For the Cartesian model, the relationship between the mind and body would mirror the 
relationship between the state and society. With the mind and the will taking sovereign control 
over the body, “the counterpart of the mechanization of the body is the development of Reason in 
its role as judge, inquisitor, manager, administrator. We find here the origins of bourgeois 
subjectivity as self-management, self-ownership, law, responsibility, with its corollaries of 
memory and identity.”19 Because individuals are seen as capable of self-managing, the necessity 
of concentrating power in the state to control people’s behavior is lessened; instead, power is 
decentralized and centered in each person. As such, “[t]he development of self-management... 
becomes an essential requirement in a capitalist socio-economic system in which self ownership 
is assumed to be the fundamental social relation.”20 According to Federici, it is this model which 
wins out over the Hobbesian model. The Cartesian model allows for the democratizing of the 
methods of social discipline. Under the Hobbesian model, success can only be achieved through 
the absolute rule of the state. It is not that the former is preferable, but simply that it is practical. 
Given the focus on socialization, and the similar (albeit not the same) views on dualism,21 
Rousseau’s philosophy continues the Cartesian model. 
With the failure of the Hobbesian model, and the success of the Cartesian model, it should 
be clear why the domination contract was able to succeed. The purpose of tricking the poor into 
‘consenting’ to the creation of legitimate political authority, or at least offering people a philosophy 
that says that government operates with the consent of the governed even if its not actually true, is 
to democratize social control. Rousseau called the creation of the state the most thought-out project 
that ever entered the human mind because what was required was convincing people to love their 
 
19 Ibid. 149. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Westmoreland, “Rousseau’s Descartes: The Rejection of Theoretical Philosophy as First Philosophy.” 
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own chains and their own jailers. With the Cartesian model, the modern social contract that took 
form in Europe, and then spread across the world, was a particular version of a contract. By 
obscuring the true masters of society (the capitalist class), governments could avoid falling into 
tyranny, and, therefore, avoid the necessity of a new social contract.  
When discussing social contract theory, authors would be remiss not to acknowledge John 
Rawls, the preeminent contract theorist of the 20th century. In his 1971 magnum opus titled A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls provided a new method of understanding how one could conceive of an 
ideal, prescriptive social contract. In his words, the aim of his book was to “present a conception 
of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the 
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.”22 According to Rawls, that best 
method by which we could conceive of the best principles of justice is by deploying a thought 
experiment whereby we imagine ourselves existing in an original position — not a state of nature, 
but a sort of state of ethereal existence — behind a veil of ignorance which shields us from knowing 
our defining features (race, sex, income level, etc.) From here, individuals would have to determine 
the principles that would order society and from which laws would be derived to constitute an 
ideal government. According to Rawls, because people do not know who in society they would 
be, individuals in the original position would seek to maximize the benefits of the people in the 
minimum position of society so that the worst off are still better off than the worst off in any other 
formed society. As such, individuals in the original position would come up with two key 
principles — the liberty principle and equality principle — to order society, and he called the 
ordering of this society justice as fairness.23  
 
22  Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 11. 
23 Ibid. See chapters 1 and 2. For maximizing the minimum, see section 26. 
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For Rawls, the social contract is a metaphor for understanding how political power should 
be constructed and deployed and how social relations should be arranged. The original position, 
and the removal of the veil of ignorance, reflect the emergence from the state of nature in the state 
of society. Justice as fairness is seen as the obtaining of the consent of the governed insofar as the 
two principles are seen as what people would willingly choose for themselves, and all other 
arrangements of society and government which flow from justice as fairness are likewise endorsed 
by people because they are entailed by justice as fairness. 
Seeking to apply his idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance to international 
affairs, Rawls wrote The Law of Peoples in 1993.24 Instead of conceiving of international affairs 
as concerning states, Rawls chose to think of the principles of global justice as laws of peoples 
because what matters is the relations between people, and that states and governments are only 
instruments by which people’s interests are mediated. As he argues in A Theory of Justice, society 
is “more or less a self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations to one another 
recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in accordance with 
them... [and] a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”25  As such, it may seem 
natural to talk about Rawls in a thesis which engages with social contract theory and issues of 
global justice.  I do not seek to apply Rawls’ theories in my thesis for a couple of reasons.  
 Foremost, I do not want to apply Rawls to my thesis because, as I make clear, this thesis is 
concerned with non-ideal theory, while Rawls’ is (mostly) concerned with ideal theory. When 
talking about transitional justice, one is necessarily talking about non-ideal conditions. It would be 
of course taken as a given that behind a veil of ignorance people in the original position would 
condemn genocide and ethnic cleansing. But because they are ignorant of their identities and have 
 
24 Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
25 Rawls 1971, 4. 
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never experienced genocide or war themselves, these individuals would be incapable of conceiving 
of what mechanisms best deal with issues of corrective justice and how to respond to atrocities. 
The epistemological barrier which Rawls uses to justify justice as fairness renders his theory 
unable to seriously grapple with transitional justice at an ontological level. It may be possible to 
adjust his theories to transitional justice but such a project would be a thesis topic unto itself. As 
such, I do not engage with Rawls in this thesis.  
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2. Transitional Justice in Rwanda 
Rwanda was colonized by Germany in 1884, lasting until 1916, after which the League of 
Nations, and later the United Nations (UN), placed it under Belgian Trusteeship until 1962. 
Although Rwanda had been under a Tutsi monarchy before and during colonial rule, ethnic 
categories were not rigid; under Belgian rule, though, ethnic membership was codified and 
exploited. In 1959, a Hutu revolution overthrew the monarchy, driving Tutsi refugees into 
neighboring countries, and, two years later, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in 
a military coup. President Habyarimana announced, in 1990, that he would allow for multi-party 
elections; not long after, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked from Uganda. Combined 
with government supported propaganda, Tutsis residing in Rwanda were labelled as accomplices 
of the RPF and many Hutu opposition party members were cast as traitors. After sporadic 
fighting and broken ceasefires, the “Arusha Accords” was negotiated in 1993 with UN 
implementation assistance. On April 6th, 1994, the President’s plane was shot down, 
precipitating the genocide.26   
 Less than four months after the RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire, the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by 
resolution 955.27 Although Rwanda had lobbied for its creation, they voted against the 
resolution.28 One strong reason for Rwanda’s opposition to the ICTR was that the most stringent 
sentence for those convicted was only life in prison, and not execution. The logics, 
competencies, and structure of the tribunal more or less mirrors that of the International Criminal 
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),29 except that the ICTR was located in Arusha 
instead of the Hague, its temporal jurisdiction (January 1st - December 31st 1994) was narrower, 
and that only violations of Article III of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II 
applied.30 Moreover, the ICTR’s mandate, unlike the ICTY, states a third purpose for its 
establishment — national reconciliation — in addition to maintaining peace and redressing 
violations.31  
The first trial in the ICTR began in the final days of 1996, a few weeks after the first 
domestic trials.32 On September 2nd 1998, Jean-Paul Akayesu was found guilty on seven counts 
of Crimes against Humanity, one count of Genocide, one count of Direct and Public Incitement 
to Commit Genocide, and not guilty on six other counts.33 He was the mayor of Taba commune 
in Gitaram prefecture. This was the first the conviction by the ICTR and first conviction for 
Genocide in any international court; two days later, the ICTR found Jean Kambanda, the 
caretaker prime minister at the beginning of the genocide, guilty one of count of Genocide, 
Conspiracy to Commit Genocide, Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, Complicity 
in Genocide, and two counts of Crimes Against Humanity — the first conviction of a head of 
government on these violations.34  Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. The median 
sentence of the ICTR, as of June 2010, was 33.5 years.35 As of June 2016, the ICTR has indicted 
93 individuals of which 61 were convicted and 14 acquitted.36 
 
29 Westberg, “Rwanda's Use of Transitional Justice After Genocide: The Gacaca Courts and the ICTR,” 6.  
30 Barria and Roper, “How Effective Are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the 
ICTR,” 354. 
31 Ibid. 357. 
32 Schabas, “Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts,” 881. 
33  Laïty, Aspegren, and Pillay, “The Prosecutor Versus Jean-Paul Akayesu: CASE NO.: ICTR-96-4-T - 
Judgement.” 
34 Laïty, Aspegren, and Pillay, “The Prosecutor Versus Jean Kambanda: CASE NO.: ICTR 97-23-S - Judgement” 
35 Hola, Smeulers, and Bijleveld, “International Sentencing Facts and Figures,” 420. 
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19 
 
In Rwanda, the volume of arrests overwhelmed the domestic court system, with estimates 
ranging from 100,000 to 120,000 citizens imprisoned, potentially facing trial.37 They only 
presented an economic determinant, as it represented a significant drain on the labor supply. By 
2004, only 10,026 cases had been handled.38 As of 2005 the International Committee of the Red 
Cross estimated 89,000 accused remained in detention.39  In 1995, Rwanda convened an 
international conference to explore different accountability mechanisms for genocide and 
implemented new legislation the following year in “Organic Law No. 08/96, Organization of 
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since 
October 1, 1990.”40 Organic Law No. 08/96 (OL 08/96) created four categories to classify 
genocide suspects based on the nature and scope of involvement in the genocide, suspects were 
to be tried in new Specialized Chambers, and new regulations on compensation and reparation 
procedures were created.41 The four categories were as follows:  
Category 1: 
a)  person whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or 
of a crime against humanity :  
b)  persons who acted in positions of authority at the national,  perfectoral, communal, 
sector or cell level, or in a political party, the or fostered such crimes;  
c)  notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice   with which they 
committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in  their areas of residence or where they 
passed; 
d)  persons who committed acts sexual torture; 
 Category 2: 
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault 
against the person causing death; 
Category 3:    
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of 
other serious assaults against the person; 
 
37 Schabas,880, see footnote 3; Westberg, 3. 
38 Westberg, 4. 
39 Schabas, 880, see footnote 4. 





persons who committed offences against property.42 
Building off of OL 08/96, The Rwandan Transitional National Assembly adopted 
Organic Law no. 40/2000 (OL 40/00) ‘on the Establishment of ‘‘Gacaca Jurisdictions’’ and the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes 
Against Humanity Committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994.’43 The gacaca 
courts, under OL 40/00 assumed jurisdiction over crimes which fell under categories 2-4 of OL 
OL 08/96, added rape to category 1, and suspects accused of category 1 crimes were still 
processed under the Specialized Courts.  “Gacaca” had existed since pre-colonial times, but was 
marginalized as colonial authorities imposed Western systems.44 Under Habyarimana, the gacaca 
process enjoyed some renewed use, but acquired a reputation as a government tool more than a 
local level institution. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the pre-colonial form of  
Gacaca returned and “[e]lders and community members once again began to preside over cases 
and hand out judgments independent of any national or local governmental oversight.”45 
Borrowing from the gacaca process, OL 04/00 sought to modernize and formalize it with 
five goals in mind: “establish the truth about what happened; accelerate the legal proceedings for 
those accused of genocide crimes; eradicate the culture of impunity; reconcile Rwandans and 
reinforce their unity; and use the capacities of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through 
a justice based on Rwandan custom."46 In June 2002, 80 pilot gacaca courts were established and 
 
42 Organic Law No. 08/96 On the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or 
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in 2006 the gacaca system began operation nationwide; by April 2009, approximately 12,000 
gacaca courts with over 169,000 judges  had completed 1.1 million cases.47  
The efficiency of the gacaca process is not just a result of different court procedures — 
there is a fundamental difference in the structure and aim of gacaca courts. There are two phases: 
information gathering and the trial. In the first phase, accusations are made, testimony collected, 
more accusations and testimony based on earlier information, and finally judges categorize 
suspects based on alleged offenses. There are three categories: the first category essentially 
corresponds to the first category from OL 08/97, the second category has three subcategories 
which essentially corresponds to the other three categories from OL 08/96, and the third category 
deals with property offenses.48 In the trial phase, category one offenses are referred to the courts 
established under OL 08/96 (until 2008 when some were moved to gacaca courts), category two 
are referred to “sector” level courts, and category three are referred to “cell” level courts. 
Because of this structure, trials often take place in the village of the accused and deliberations are 
open to the community members. In the case of category three offenses, parties may even settle 
the dispute between themselves with judges acting as supervisors and ratifiers of final 
agreements. Most importantly, both in sentencing guidelines and the material structure of the 
proceedings themselves, confessions are encouraged.49 Placing a high value on confessions 
supports more speedy trials as well as an atmosphere of reconciliation as lower level offenders 
appeal for re-integration with their former communities. 
One last note before moving to the next section. Following an agreement in 1992, a truth 
commission had been established to investigate and report on atrocities since October 1, 1990 
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and published mid 1993. The report was well received domestically and internationally, but its 
work was short lived.50 Importantly, this was a truth commission set up before the Rwandan 
genocide, and was intended to investigate past atrocities  The work of truth and reconciliation 
lives on, though, in the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), which was 
created in a 1999 law.51 The work of the Rwandan government through, and in addition to, the 
NURC has been in some ways laudable. The government has prioritized fighting poverty, 
furthering socio-economic justice, and leading development projects as necessary for promoting 
national unity and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.  There have also been a number of 
local associations which promote community integration. It is in these local associations where a 
lot of the work of what other national truth and reconciliation commissions have done. For 
instance, associations have ‘dialogue-building programs,’ encouraging repentance,  and 
programs to “sensitize other Rwandans with whom they live side by side in “the community to 
tell the truth.”52 Having a decentralized, local process may lead to Rwandans feeling as if they 
‘own’ the process more than if it was a centralized, national level process. The report argues that 
the work of the local associations have promoted a sense of ‘national identity.’ 
Not everyone looks so positively on the NURC. Janine Clark argues that the 
reconciliation project’s focus on national unity is meant to be created by a negation of ethnic 
differences, thereby making a false unity wherein people can not be open and honest about the 
past.53 The problem with negating ethnic differences, and instead trying to impose a ‘Rwandan 
identity’ against the Tutsi and Hutu distinction, is that the argument presupposes an 
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oversimplified view of the cause(s) of the genocide. It is important to understand that at least part 
of the cause of the genocide was political differences, not just some old, tribal hatreds that 
naturally lead to violence. Rwanda was transitioning into a multi-party democracy. Political 
divisions that cut across ethnic lines would be papered over in a world where national unification 
rested on the view that the opposite of unity is defined solely as ethnic division. This being said, 
the author’s article is based on theoretical analyses of the NURC’s themes and programs, and not 
on any empirical data.54  
The last transitional justice mechanism used in response to Rwanda is universal 
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction refers to domestic criminal prosecutions for acts that are 
illegal under international law, and took place outside the borders of the prosecuting state. In 
2001, a Belgian court convicted two nuns for their participation in the killings of Rwandans who 
sought refuge in their convent.55 The principle which guides universal jurisdiction is “the notion 
that certain crimes are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled — and even 
obliged — to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the crime or 
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”56 Universal jurisdiction is currently guided by 
what are called “The Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction,” based on deliberations by 
the Princeton Project at Princeton University in 2001. The 14 Principles outline everything from 
qualifying international crimes to basics of jurisprudence to guide prosecutions to matters of 
international relations which would limit the scope of applicability. It is worth noting that 
universal jurisdiction, albeit not known by the terminology at the time, is probably the oldest use 
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of the discussed mechanisms. The most common crime prosecuted has been piracy, and later 
slavery. War crimes and crimes against humanity are relatively new additions.57  
Although there have been a few more cases since the first prosecutions of the nuns in 
Belgium, they were contained to prosecuting suspects who already resided in the host countries 
and did not represent a “prosecute or extradite” form of combating impunity elsewhere.58 The 
“prosecute or extradite” principle of international law, and not just universal jurisdiction, holds 
that if an accused criminal is within a state’s border, that said state has the obligation to either 
prosecute the accused or to extradite him or her to a country willing to pursue a prosecution. 
Examples of crimes that generally fall under the purview of  “prosecute or extradite” principle 
which do not apply to universal jurisdiction are terrorism and international drug trafficking. This 
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3. Transitional Justice in the former Yugoslavia 
 The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) consisted of six republics: Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. After reforms to 
the constitution in 1974, two autonomous regions within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were 
given more power at the federal level. Because internal boundaries rarely coincided with 
demographic distribution and a weak central government, economic crises throughout the 1980s 
stirred inter-ethnic tension and nationalist unrest. By 1991, Croatia and Slovenia each declared 
independence, followed by a successful referendum in Macedonia, and a vote for independence 
in BiH.   
What distinguished the conflict in BiH and Croatia was the difference in military 
capacities. Under the SFRY, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was composed of members of 
every ethnic group, although disproportionately made up of Serbs. Each republic also had its 
own military units, as well as local units of varying levels, which resembled reserves/national 
guards and irregular militias which could be activated by the central government if needed. 
When the wars broke out, these different units divided and coalesced along ethnic lines and 
members of larger units, such as the JNA, appropriated weapons and materiel for each ethnic 
groups’ use. In BiH, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs relied on their “big brother” republics for 
support; Bosnian Muslims, however, had no such protector.60 When Slovenia and Croatia 
declared independence, Slovenians and Croats in the JNA deserted and joined their respective 
armies, effectively cementing Serb dominance of the JNA. Moreover, the UNSC enacted an arms 
embargo in late 1991 and, despite a UN General Assembly resolution calling for an embargo 
exemption for BiH which failed in the Security Council, cemented the disparity between Bosnian 
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Muslims and their Serbian counterparts.61 The conflict formally ended with the Dayton 
agreement on December 14 1995.62 
The disparity was even greater in Kosovo. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, then president of 
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, forced through a constitutional amendment which stripped 
Kosovo’s autonomy, allowing for the centralization of security forces in Belgrade.63  One year 
later, the regional assembly unilaterally declared independence and was subsequently disbanded 
by Serbian government.64 After the Dayton agreement affirmed Serbia’s territorial integrity, 
lacking any formal institutions, embittered Kosovar Albanians joined the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) and enjoyed some support from Albanian émigrés; in 1998, the KLA began to 
attack Serbian officials and was met with a disproportionate response by Serbian forces. After 
Milosevic rejected a US-European proposal to restore Kosovo autonomy in February 1999 and 
launched an ethnic cleansing operation, NATO began a 78 day bombing campaign which 
resulted in an agreement to a peacekeeping mission.65 The United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)  was established the following day, on June 10, 
1999 by UNSC resolution 1244.66  
The ICTY was created on May 25, 1993 by UNSC resolution 827 and was inaugurated 
on November 17, 1993 at the Peace Palace in the Hague.67 Although Dragan Nikolic, a 
commander of Bosnian Serb detention camp, faced the first indictment of the ICTY, on 
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November 7, 1994,68 it would not be until May 7, 1996 that an indictee, Dusan (aka Dusko) 
Tadic, a Bosnian Serb politician  and former paramilitary, faced trial — almost three years after 
the ICTY’s creation.69 As of August 2019, proceedings for 158 of the 161 accused have 
concluded with 90 sentenced, 18 acquitted, and the other 50 referred to national courts or 
concluded for other reasons.70 The median sentence handed down in the ICTY as of June 2010 
was 15 years.71 
As part of the Dayton agreement, BiH was divided into two regional entities, the Federal 
Republic of Bosnia (or Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but hereinafter FBiH) and 
Republicka Srpska (RS), with a third polity, Brčko District, created in 2000.72 Below the regional 
level, the local governments are constituted as follows: The FBiH has 10 cantons and 
municipalities within each, the RS has municipalities and five district courts, and the Brčko 
District has a Basic Court.73 The procedures for prosecution at the domestic levels for BiH as 
well as Croatia and Serbia were determined by the 1996 Rome Agreement under “Rules of the 
Road” (RoR) so as to avoid any accusations of bias. The ICTY reviewed and approved all 
domestic prosecutions against alleged war criminals.74 
The Dayton agreement also established a tripartite presidency represented by one Croat, 
one Serb, and one Bosniak and established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which 
was later endowed with special powers that allowed for a high degree of executive control. The 
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OHR, in partnership with the ICTY, established the Bosnia War Crimes Chambers (BWCC) in 
2005 and installed it within the State Court (national) system that had been established three 
years prior.75 There are two other criminal courts at the State Court level, one of which handles 
economic crimes and the other general crimes, and the BWCC is comprised of five three-person 
panels and one five-person appellate panel. Moreover, the State Prosecutor’s office was 
expanded with the addition of the Special Department for War Crimes.76 The BWCC and the 
State Prosecutor’s office were to be staffed by a mix of international and Bosnian jurists, for 
which the ratio would change over time. The purpose of the Prosecutor’s office and its expansion 
was to ensure that cases proceeded impartially and competently, build local judicial capacities 
through the cooperative arrangement, instantiate local trust in institutions, and help justice be 
done in a speedier manner. 
The creation of the BWCC and the Special Department was precipitated by a winding 
down of the RoR and the review authority of local prosecutions passed from the ICTY’s Office 
of the Prosecutor to the national level. Moreover, as the ICTY sought to complete their work 
within a timeline provided by the UNSC, cases were transferred to the national level under Rule 
11 bis.77 Given the variety and scope of responsibilities, the Special Department had a 
monumental task at hand: they needed to initiate prosecutions, process ICTY transfers, review 
new local prosecutions, and transfer prosecutions to local courts. In 2008, the Bosnian Ministry 
of Justice developed a “National War Crimes Strategy” to streamline this process and 
communicate their plan to receive responsibilities.78 According to a 2011 study by the OSCE, 
between 2005 and September 2010, the BWCC has tried 166 cases, with 52 of the 68 completed 
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cases resulting in convictions.79 Nonetheless, there are still a number of cases to be heard at both 
the national and local level. 
 Although the conditions of the judiciary in BiH were quite bad, it could not compare to 
that of Kosovo. Because of actions taken under Milosevic as mentioned earlier, the entire 
security and legal apparatus relied on Serbian forces. After the signing of the Rambouillet 
agreement, the peacekeeping mission was established two-fold: operational control fell to 
NATO, which established the Kosovo Force for military presence, and civilian administration 
was led by a special representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) and through UNMIK.80  In 
2000, UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/64 which created “Regulation 64 Panels,” which were 
judicial panels made up of two international judges and one Kosovo judge. Moreover, the SRSG 
had the ultimate authority to replace any local jurist (i.e. judge, prosecutor, etc.) with 
international personnel, which could be requested through a petition by another jurist but was 
also ex proprio motu.81 Moreover, the SRSG could strike down any law passed by the Kosovo 
Assembly per the Constitutional Framework promulgated on May 15, 2001.82 This arrangement 
lasted until 2008, when Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, and much of the 
overarching mission mandates passed to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
(EULEX).83 
 EULEX was created “to ‘Monitor, Mentor, and Advise’ or MMA all institutions related 
to the rule of law while retaining executive powers to adjudicate certain categories of serious and 
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complex crimes.”84 EULEX operates within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1244, the same 
resolution which established UNMIK, meaning they initially shared competencies and functions. 
Pursuant to its institution and capacity building mandate, EULEX worked with the Kosovo 
Assembly to pass “Law No. 03/L-053 on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of 
EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, which gave EULEX judges the authority to hear 
cases in Kosovo courts under the authority of the Assembly of EULEX judges.”85 The law also 
integrated EULEX participation with the “Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPRK) in a 
complex web of organizational relations.”86  
 Unfortunately, due to a number of pre-existing organizational deficiencies as well as 
unclear policy directions, EULEX’s use of executive functions bled into the administration of its 
MMA duties, hampering capacity building goals and reminding locals of the UNMIK’s legacy.87 
Recognizing this problem, in 2012 “an agreement was signed between the Kosovo Justice 
Minister, the EU Special Representative, and the head of EULEX under the Compact on Joint 
Rule of Law Objectives that defines EULEX priorities for the 2012-2014 mandate.”88 Under the 
Compact, no formal authorities or powers would change; however, EULEX committed to 
changing the implementation of their MMA duties, with a focus on informal mentoring, 
separating the personnel who advise and monitor from those whom enact executive functions, 
and a greater commitment to devolving competencies to local panels and judges. In assessing the 
success of the EULEX mission to adjudicate war crimes cases, it’s important to understand the 
situation which was inherited from UNMIK as well as the fact that many of the perpetrators 
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would have left Kosovo in 1999. As it stands, there are currently 100 EULEX/Kosovo war 
crimes investigations, five ongoing trials, 15 adjudicated cases, and 13 arrest warrants for 
Serbian defendants outside of Kosovo.89 
 The last policy frequently deployed in periods of transition is lustration. Lustration refers 
to the removal of public officials from the bureaucracy, and the prohibition of individuals from 
serving in future government positions. In BiH, significant vetting of the police force was 
necessary for the post-Dayton Accords periods, as many police officers were deployed as 
soldiers during the former Yugoslav wars. Additionally, judges and prosecutors required vetting, 
as the weak judiciary required trustworthy jurists while UNMIK and EULEX was underway. 
From 1999 to 2002, 24,000 police officers were vetted and approximately 1,000 judges and 
prosecutors were vetted from 2002 to 2004.90 Lustration can be an important policy tool in 
limiting the influence of previous regimes when mass prosecutions may be politically infeasible.  
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4. A Dialogue Between Social Contract Theory and Transitional Justice 
 In the following section, I apply social contract theory to issues of transitional justice, 
combined with other sociological, political, and philosophical theories. I use these theories to 
answer three questions: Why do people commit genocide? What is the social contract under 
transitional justice? What should the international community do to help countries under 
transitional justice?  
Before addressing these questions, it is first important to look at what has already been said 
about the combined subject. In looking through the literature, I could not find that much discussion 
of both subjects. Most references to social contract theory and transitional justice briefly mention 
the social contract, and invite the reader to imagine transitional justice as being a moment of 
creating a new social contract, and then quickly moves on from that point. For instance, in a three 
year strategic plan, the International Center for Transitional Justice mentions the social contract 
once, invoking the metaphor to talk about new constitutions.91  In a journal article about indigenous 
rights and relations in New Zealand, the author similarly references the social contract to talk about 
a treaty between Maori tribes and the British settlers as a reimagined social contract which founded 
the eventual New Zealand state.92  I could only find two sources that tried to talk extensively about 
what the social contract is and how that could inform transitional justice.  
In a book on the transitions from communism to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, Noel 
Calhoun discusses what she identifies as the ‘five key tools’ of the ideology of liberal democracy: 
1. Social contract metaphor structures the way that politicians think about the past and 
the responsibility of a new regime for a past regime’s unjust acts. 
2. The rule of law forbids the exercise of force without legal authority 
3. The ideology of democracy ascribes great value to inclusive participation. 
4. Openness is a significant value. (Freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.) 
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5. Many people throughout the world express their desire to live under a liberal 
democratic regime because it holds out the promise of justice.93  
For Calhoun, the social contract represents an ‘invented tradition’ by liberalism, an anachronism 
for our current society. Social contract theory has contributed three things to liberal democratic 
theory. First, it contributes the rule of law, which provides predictability, consistency and 
impartiality of judgments. Second, it contributes a legitimate source of law by way of the consent 
of the governed. Third, it contributes a “surprising model for radical, yet peaceful, political 
change.”94 Calhoun derives her vision of the social contract from a Hobbesian model, explicitly 
invoking and citing the Leviathan, but I believe she fails to grapple with the implications of his 
entire work, specifically that people are incapable of change and that they act according to natural 
laws. 
 Calhoun goes on to argue that social contract theory divides time into three phases or eras: 
the past, the devising of the social contract, and the post-contractual society. In this way, there is 
an organizing of our thoughts about the present society and what constitutes the ‘past’ before the 
contract. In the past, there is no reason to assess ‘crimes’ committed under the state of nature. 
Because violence is unavoidable, any normative assessment is irrelevant. Standards of society do 
not bear on the state of nature. In the second phase, the procedures involved in the devising of the 
social contract “inveighs against holding individuals responsible for unjust acts committed during 
the state of nature. People may not be excluded from the social contract on the basis of their past 
offenses.”95 The social contract then established the rule of law, which promises equal protection 
under the law, as well as predictability, because punishments for crimes are already known. For 
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this reason, there should be no retroactive prosecution. Lastly, in the post-contractual society, 
Calhoun believes that the social contract should be forward-looking. The erasure of the past is 
necessary for order. It is clear that the author does not seriously consider the social contract theory 
of Hobbes, as well as providing no mention or citation of Rousseau. I believe that her analysis 
would have been better served if she considered his contract theory. Lastly, Calhoun analyzes the 
nation-state as a single, cogent actor instead of understanding that there are ruling classes, and 
class conflict which can drive the policy choices of governments. 
The best interpretation and application of the social contract to a subject related to 
transitional justice, although not precisely regarding it, comes from the Norwegian Peacebuilding 
Resource Centre. It is important to note that this concept note is concerned with peacebuilding 
generally, and not transitional justice specifically. Mezzera, et. al. begin by acknowledging the 
contributions of Rousseau to the concept of the social contract. Unlike in this thesis, they focus on 
the normative features of the social contract, or what a social contract ought to look like, as well 
as the descriptive features. From Rousseau, they identify two politico-philosophical lineages: 
“[f]or the liberal-individualistic lineage, a social contract should serve to maintain property rights 
and public order. For the human rights and equity lineage, social justice is the goal.”96 Although it 
is true that both lineages have motivated political decisions, in the liberal-individualistic lineage it 
seems easier to find the domination contract, inasmuch as the focus of the contract is on property 
rights and public order.  
 In the democratic, industrialized parts of the world, the authors state that there is a political 
equilibrium which balances the interests of different groups within society, which is to be 
contrasted with ‘conflict-afflicted’ countries. In these countries, the equilibrium includes more 
 
96 Mezzera, Sogge, and Lister, “Engaged Societies, Responsive States: The Social Contract in Situations of Conflict 
and Fragility,” 8. 
35 
 
than just the state — political elites, non-state actors, and informal institutions share the 
responsibilities and revenues that normally would flow entirely through the state. Such 
equilibriums fail to deliver universal standards of governance and are considered unstable. 
 The authors then present a comprehensive definition of a social contract, as developed by 
a team commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The 
social contract is “a process for bargaining, articulating and mediating society’s expectations of 
the state”97 with 5 key features: 
1. expectations that a given society has of a given state 
2. state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its 
population and territory to provide these services (in part a function of economic resources) 
3. élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations 
4. the existence of political processes through which the bargain between state and society is 
struck, reinforced and institutionalised 
5. legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating political 
process.98 
Important to the features and definition of the social contract is that everything is seen as in flux. 
The social contract is a process; it is the bargaining, articulating, and mediating of society’s 
expectations over how state capacities will be used through political processes directed by elite 
will, and in exchange for a conferral of legitimacy upon the state by the members of society. 
 The authors go on to distinguish between a social contract and a social covenant. A social 
covenant is a horizontal agreement between groups across various demographic differences within 
a political community to cooperate together and with the state. In the context of preparing a 
document to inform peacekeeping policies, this makes sense; peacekeeping missions sometimes 
deal with quite literal covenants, written down and signed, which are a part of some accords, peace 
treaties, or even a constitution. The social covenant may also be interpreted broadly, and 
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philosophically. According to the definition that the authors use, a social covenant can be seen as 
creating the society whereas the social contract creates the state. The social covenant is seen as 
determining the fundamental principles and values that undergird society. On this interpretation, I 
would compare the author’s distinction to that of Mills’ distinction between the moral social 
contract and the political social contract.  
 The other concept which the authors relate to the social contract is social cohesion, which 
“refers to the reduction of disparities, inequalities, and social exclusion within or between societal 
groups, as well as the strengthening of social relations, interactions, and trust. Such disparities 
often coincide with political divisions and forms of organied [sic] violence, sometimes driven by 
long–standing grievances and collective humiliation.”99 Social cohesion and social contracts are 
interrelated. Poor social cohesion can be repaired by renegotiating the social contract. Likewise, 
poor social cohesion undermines the stability of the existing social contract.  
 Given this discussion by the authors, it is clear that there can be meaningful dialogue with 
political scientific research related to transitional justice and social contract theory. This being 
said, there was little engagement with the philosophical aspects of the social contract and what 
defines them. The most positive aspects of the authors’ contribution is that they recognize that the 
state is not one cogent actor but, rather, influenced by elites and other social groups pushing and 
pulling policy decisions, and that the social contract is as much a process as it is a thing at a 
particular moment in time.  
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5. Why Do People Commit Genocide? 
 In conducting my research for this thesis, in discussions with non-academics, a frequent 
question I would get is “why do people commit genocide?” There are of course racially tinged, or 
orientalizing, explanations for some genocides. For example, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
was merely the result of “primordial hatreds and ancient grievances,” according to neoconservative 
thinkers.100 Foreign policy experts like Robert Kaplan, whose writings influenced Bill Clinton’s 
foreign policy, set aside the secular, political interests of factions in war and instead portrayed the 
violence in the Balkans as a result of tribal and religious conflict that went back centuries. This is, 
obviously, an unscientific view of the subject. Ethnic divisions do play a part in conflict, but it is 
better understood as a modifier to the conflict. Ethnic, racial, and religious groupings lead to 
sorting among participants in conflicts. If, as Carl von Clausewitz is correct in saying that “[w]ar 
is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political 
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means”101 then perhaps we might say that genocide 
is a continuation of contentious politics by other means. 
 Charles Tilly extensively developed theories in contentious politics, which he defined as 
“discontinuous, public, collective claim-making in which one of the parties is the government.”102 
When politics become contentious, there is a higher chance of ‘collective violence,’ episodic social 
interactions characterized by the inflicting of damage, towards both people and objects, and some 
level of coordination. During periods of contentious politics, coordination is usually preceded by 
‘boundary activation,’ the “shift in social interactions such that they increasingly (a) organize 
around a single us-them boundary and (b) differentiate between within-boundary and cross-
 
100 Atanasoski, Humanitarian Violence, 59. Atanasoski is referring to comments by Robert Kaplan. 
101 von Clausewitz, On War, 119. 
102 Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence, 9. 
38 
 
boundary interactions.”103 Social inequality — often a source of contentious politics — is 
generated by exploitation and opportunity hoarding, the securing of a valuable resource by and for 
a categorically bounded network. Boundary activation is often in response to threats, whether 
perceived or real, to hoarded opportunities and resources, with the boundaries mapping onto the 
bounded network. The distribution and arrangement of opportunities and exploitation influence 
the propensity for one type of boundary to be activated over others. So, even in a deeply 
misogynistic society, there might be little solidarity between women of different ethnic groups if 
socio-economic arrangements are determined by ethnicity.  
In the course of boundary activation, the heightening of contention leads to greater attempts 
to coordinate collective action. Organizations, as well as individual organizers, seek to build power 
by incorporating previously inactive members of their group, resulting in  brokerage, the “linking 
of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one 
another and/or with yet other sites.”104  Brokerage is a type of relational mechanism, a social 
mechanism which alters the connections between and among people. Relational mechanisms, 
along with dispositional and environmental mechanisms, combine and reproduce to trigger social 
change. Social processes are sequences of mechanisms which replicate in patterns, often leading 
to similar outcomes. Four processes, or groups of mechanisms, common to contentious politics are 
mobilization, political identity formation, coalition formation, and polarization. Tilly defines 
polarization as the  
widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the 
gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other, or both 
extremes. When it occurs, polarization is an important accompaniment to contentious 
episodes because it vacates the moderate center, impedes the recomposition of previous 
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coalitions, produces new channels for future ones, fills even the most pragmatic of policy 
issues with ideological content.105 
These processes also interact with and reproduce each other. Mobilization and coalition formation 
often leads to an opposing coalition formation, and then polarization. What is significant about a 
cycle of coalition formation and counter-coalition formation is for the linking of unrelated issues.  
 Imagine group A, group B, group ~A, and group ~B, with each letter pair groups holding 
opposing positions. Groups A and B are more powerful than groups ~A and ~B, so groups ~A and 
~B decide to form a coalition to fight against both groups A and B. Before the formation of the 
first coalition, neither group A or B had any contact; however, faced with emboldened opponents, 
a counter-coalition would beneficial for both. Subsequent iterations would add groups C and ~C, 
D and ~D, etc. leading to polarization. This account of coalition formation and counter-formation 
is simplistic, and provides a rational explanation for a social phenomena which may lack any 
reasoned approach on the part of the actual decision makers. Once there is significant enough 
polarization, the social practice of forming a coalition with the enemy of your enemy can detach 
from initial utilitarian considerations and become instinctual, reactionary position-taking. When 
an adversary is prone to automatic disagreement, a savvy group can bait their opponent into taking 
unsavory positions or alliances which they would never have accepted under restrained 
deliberations. Of course, not every coalition formation and mobilization leads to a counter-
formation, even in a polarized society; moreover, not every counter-coalition will have the same 
level of coordination or resource pooling. Even in the baiting example, the forced alliance may be 
in name only.  
 From examining contentious politics we can see processes that may precipitate genocide. 
This is not to say that it is always the case. In most instance of contentious politics, there is no 
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where near the level of violence that would approach that of a genocide or ethnic cleansing. Nor 
have all cases of genocide historically been precipitated by contentious politics. I believe, however, 
that in most cases there have been, such as in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia.  
In both scenarios, prior to the outbreak of genocidal violence, there were transitions 
towards a more liberal, democratic society. In Rwanda, President Habyarimana had announced in 
1990 a transition towards a multi-party democracy. This was followed by an invasion of the RPF, 
leading to a three year civil war that ended in 1993. With the Arusha Accords in place, there were 
to be general elections for the national government with participation from multiple parties. The 
election never happened because of the death of Hayarimana and the outbreak of the Rwandan 
genocide. In the former Yugoslavia, the federal Yugoslav government moved towards ending one 
party rule, but tensions between the Serbian and Croats and Slovenian Socialist Republics led to 
secessions by the latter, and the yet to be recognized break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic. 
The breakout of war led Croats and Slovenians in what is today the BiH to join arms with their 
comrades from the Socialist Republics of Croatia and Slovenia respectively. The Bosnian Muslims 
lacked a “brother republic” to defend them against Serbians, so they were subjected to ethnic 
cleansing. Later the Kosovars faced ethnic cleansing for similar reasons as the Bosnian Muslims. 
Why did the move towards, and potential for, political liberalization end up leading to genocidal 
violence, and why did the violence mostly fall along ethnic lines? 
 In both situations, the move towards liberalization brought the potential (and in all 
probability would have, had events unfolded differently) relative decline in the position of the 
ruling ethnic group. There would not have been an inversion in power relations, where they became 
the ruled over, but just a decline in power. In Rwanda, the stepping down of President 
Habyarimana, a Hutu that implemented policies which benefited Hutus, and  multiparty elections 
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would have brought some Tutsis into government as well as moderate Hutus that wanted equal 
treatment for both groups. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serb dominated Socialist Federal 
Republic would have lost a substantial territorial loss with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia, 
and Bosnian Serbs would not have been in the majority in a seceded BiH. Serbs in the remaining 
republics still would have remained in power — in fact, with the departure of the other Socialist 
Republics, their relative power within the remaining state would have increased! — but Serbian 
power over the region would have waned. Facing such possibilities, Serbs and Hutus would have 
had fewer opportunities and resources to hoard. With this threat, boundaries were activated, where 
the boundaries were determined by the ethinc identity of the bounded network. This activation led 
to mobilization, and cross-class coalitions. In the absence of strong civic institutions and the rule 
of law, polarization accelerated unabadated into genocide. The only opposition to be found was in 
the counter-coalitions and mobilization by Croats and Slovenians, and by the already armed and 
mobilized Tutsi forces in the RPF.  
 Given these facts, it still may appear difficult to imagine that ordinary people would be 
motivated to commit acts of genocide over what is fundamentally a question of unequal resource 
distribution. Would you really be willing to kill innocent civilians for a better paying job, or a 
slightly bigger home? Many of the participants in the conflict may not have actually benefited 
from the uneven distribution of resources prior to the conflict. Certainly the risk of dying would 
make participation in a campaign of ethnic cleansing imprudent. If it is difficult to imagine still 
why most seemingly moral people would participate in a genocide, I ask the reader to consider 
what Mark Twain wrote, and to think about some comparisons to other policies. Twain wrote: 
There were two “Reigns of Terror,” if we would but remember it and consider it; the one 
wrought murder in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood; the one lasted mere 
months, the other had lasted a thousand years; the one inflicted death upon ten thousand 
persons, the other upon a hundred millions; but our shudders are all for the “horrors” of the 
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minor Terror, the momentary Terror, so to speak; whereas, what is the horror of swift death 
by the axe, compared with lifelong death from hunger, cold, insult, cruelty, and heart-
break?  What is swift death by lightning compared with death by slow fire at the stake?  A 
city cemetery could contain the coffins filled by that brief Terror which we have all been 
so diligently taught to shiver at and mourn over; but all France could hardly contain the 
coffins filled by that older and real Terror—that unspeakably bitter and awful Terror which 
none of us has been taught to see in its vastness or pity as it deserves.106 
I am not attempting to normatively compare between genocides, or to differentiate state policies. 
Instead, we should consider that although there are genocides of ‘hot passion,’ people of seeming 
normal moral compunction may not notice the long, slow genocide done in ‘heartless cold blood.’ 
Take for example the Israeli occupation of Palestine. 
 With Israel and Palestine, there was a quick, hot passionate moment of Terror — the Nakba, 
or the “miraculous clearing of the land” from the Zionist perspective.107 Ever since the Nakba, 
parts or all of Palestinian territory (including both what the international community recoqnizes as 
the territory in Gaza and the West Bank, and the Israel, which proponents of Palestinian liberation 
also consider Palestinian land) have been occupied by the Israeli state, and to this day there is 
significant strictures on all of Palestinain life.108 From control of who is allowed into and out of 
Gaza and West Bank, to prohibitions on Palestinian fishing along their own coasts, to control over 
the electrical and water supplies for the territories, the Israeli government exercises significant 
authority over what is ostensibly Palestinian governed bodies, with no democratic recourse. The 
Israeli policy towards legitimizing illegal settlements by Israeli settlers is nothing short of a slow 
paced ethnic cleansing of Palestinian land. Paired with rampant killings of civilians, polluted water 
supplies, denial of healthcare, the Israeli government is also slowly killing the Palestinian people, 
making living conditions literally unlivable in the hopes that more Palestinians would leave, and 
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Palestniain refugees would give up hope on returning. The question is, how can ostensibly moral 
people support, or even perpetrate these crimes?109  
I invite the reader to consider lastly the era of Jim Crow. Again, I do not want the reader to 
believe that I am drawing any normative comparisons. Everything discussed is bad and wrong, 
and I am not here to order all of the harms of the world from most bad to least bad. I only invite 
the reader to to consider these various cases to help get insight into how people get to a position 
where they are willing to commit genocide. I need not belabor the horrors of the Jim Crow era. I 
bring up the subject for only two reasons: 1. to show that millions of seemingly good, upstanding 
people would support and participate in a system that wreaked a slow, heartless terror on millions 
of their fellow citizens, much as Twain describes and 2. there is a difference between structural 
inequalities and oppression, and a slow ethnic cleansing. The difference is the social contract.  
African-Americans were, and are, a party to the social contract categorized as subhumans, 
or second class citizens. This can be contrasted with the indigenous populations, who were 
collectively subjected to multiple genocides at the hands of white America (as there were many 
tribal nations that were wiped out), who are not considered a party to the American social contract. 
The same may be said of Palestine. Some Israelis in fact try to argue essentially this point, that 
because some of the past governments have sought a two-state solution that the Israeli government 
does not have to be responsive to the demands of Palestinians living in Palestine (which ignores 
the separate treatment for Israelis and Palestinians living in Israel). This is a misguided argument 
because, as stated above, Israel controls, at a minimum, the borders, immigration policy, and trade 
policy of the Palestinian territories, which makes it ruling the polity. Regardless, the mindset of 
the Israelis who do not actively oppose the occupation of Palestine is that Palestinians are not a 
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party to their social contract, and therefore ought not enjoy its protections. This is why there has 
not only been a proliferation of extrajudicial killings of Palestinians by the Israeli Defense 
Forces,110 but senior politicians have in fact encouraged soldiers to commit these killings.111 From 
this, it should be easier to see why people are willing to commit genocide: they do not see their 
victims as a party to their social contract, and are therefore in the state of nature, devoid of social-
political obligations. To look more into the psychology of perpetrators, I turn to Claudia Card and 
a theory of evil. 
According to Claudia Card’s atrocity theory, evil(s) can be understood as “foreseeable 
intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing.”112 On Card’s theory, evil is defined by both 
the perspective of the victim (the harm felt) and the perpetrator (the wrongdoing committed). 
Additionally, the wrongdoing includes inaction, insofar as the harm is foreseeable and the actors 
are culpable for the inaction. So, the British (lack of) response to the Irish famine(s) could be 
considered evil insofar as mass starvation was foreseeable and the government had a responsibility 
to the Irish people to provide for their welfare. Card’s theory of evil goes beyond mass harms to 
include domestic abuse, or what she terms “terrorism in the home” to contrast with rape as a 
weapon of war.113 What is important to this thesis is her approach to the psychological question of 
why people do evil. 
 Card begins her discussion of the psychological reasons behind evil with Kant’s theory of 
radical evil. It’s worth noting that Kant has a similar account of the social contract to Rousseau, in 
some ways. Most notable (in my opinion) is his view on the unsociable sociability of human 
beings, which is similar to Rousseau’s account of amour-propre and amour de soi.  In fact, they 
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are so similar that Rawls referred to Kant as “the best interpreter of Rousseau.”114 Returning to 
evil, according to Kant, there is a two step process to our actions and motivations. First, one adopts 
a supreme principle to abide by, such as the Categorical Imperative, and then one acts in the real 
world according to what said supreme principle legislates. The ‘good will’ is the motivation that 
people have to act according to what duty prescribes, and acting on the good will is what makes 
an act a moral act. Evil, for Kant, has three gradients, or stages. In the first stage, people are weak, 
inasmuch as they adopt the correct supreme principle but they sometimes fail to act according to 
its legislation, giving in to self-interest or other inclinations. In the second stage, people have mixed 
motives, and act both from the good will and self-interest. In the third stage, radical evil takes hold 
and people have subverted the moral principle, which ought to be the supreme principle, to the 
principle of self-interest, or prudence. To reiterate, Kant’s analysis is at the level of motivation, 
not action. So in four situations, four people could each separately act according to the good will, 
to weakness, to mixed motives, and to radical evil, and all perform the same act. What defines 
radical evil is that the motivation is prudence, not a sense of duty. 
 What distinguishes the good and evil is that a moral supreme principle legislates actions 
whereas the principle of prudence does not. Evil is not simply posed as doing the not-moral thing. 
As such, Kant’s theory denies the existence of (fundamentally) evil desires, interests, or immoral 
principles. He denies that people have essentially diabolical inclinations; however, he does 
acknowledge that there are ‘diabolical vices.’ Kant argues that these vices “do not really issue from 
nature as their root but are rather inclinations, in the face of the anxious endeavor of others to attain 
a hateful superiority over us to procure it for ourselves over them for the sake of security as 
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preventive measure.”115 So these vices “at first appears to be an evil inclination is at bottom a 
response from fear based on our felt need for the goods of protection and security. [Kant] insists 
that evil lies only in our choices to accord too much importance to our inclinations, not in the 
inclinations themselves.”116 The problem with Kant’s view of radical evil and the good will is that 
if one acts neither according to duty nor to prudence, there appears to be no answer. 
 To answer ‘Kant’s mystery,’ as Card refers to the third possible motivation, she turns to 
theories of normative self-conception. Herein lies a distillation of Kant’s views that he himself 
only partially made. According to Kant, we could assess the morality of our actions and 
motivations by imagining an impartial rational spectator with perfect knowledge (i.e. God) and 
whether such a spectator would judge us as having acted morally. The perfect scenario for Kant’s 
ethics is that we act only according to our duty and that we are happy in our conduct. The only 
entity capable of giving us true happiness is God, and God seeks to reward those who act morally. 
As such, “[t]he moral worth of an action in Kant’s ethics, conferred by the motive of duty, makes 
one worthy of being rewarded with happiness by an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly just 
rational spectator. Actual reward is not the goal. (That goal would make the behavior prudent.) 
The goal is to be worthy — worthy of a reward that would symbolize the esteem of its bestower.”117 
So if the moral worthiness of actions derives from the esteem of God, we can understand a third 
motivation as an inclination for the esteem of others (who are not God). The desire for the esteem 
of others is not itself the motivation of prudence (or self-interest), but a desire to fulfill one’s self-
conception. To elucidate this third motivation, Card first draws on Christine Korsgaard’s theory 
of self-conception as a source of normativity. 
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 According to Korsgaard, normativity can be sourced from one’s self conception, or 
‘practical identity.’ A ‘practical identity’ is “a description under which you value yourself, a 
description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking.”118 So, our practical identities may have a host of constituent, contingent principles 
or inclinations, which may or may not be self-consciously recognized. A desire to act according to 
our self-conception can then be added to the principle of prudence as a principle to which morality 
may be subverted as a supreme principle. Evil can then be expanded to include the subverting of 
morality to one of these contingent principles. As such, “what is given priority over morality need 
not be prudence but could be the good of some specific group, such as one’s racial or ethnic group 
or one’s gender. One could be as willing to give up one’s own individual interests, or even to die, 
to promote that good as others are willing to do for the sake of moral ideals.”119 Here we can see 
where nationalism may take hold. The desire to further the interests of one’s nation (and not merely 
defend legitimate interests, as what might be considered self-defense, and therefore be morally 
permissible or even obligated), may be seen as neither stemming from a sense of morality nor 
prudence, but stemming instead from our self-conceptions, and a desire to live according to the 
precepts which we believe to define our practical identity.  
 Korsgaard’s theory can also help explain why people behave in different moral ways to 
members of one’s own group and non-members. Robert J. Lifton, in an account of Nazi doctors, 
posits a the concept of ‘doubling.’ With doubling, people create a ‘second self’ so that they can 
perpetrate behaviors which would be inconsistent with one’s ostensible values.120 The question 
then is that are people doing good acts (in a utilitarian sense) and acting truly according to moral 
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principles (the good will) in only some cases, and doing bad acts (in a utilitarian sense) for bad 
reasons, or are the good acts and bad acts done for the same reason — membership in a shared 
group and non-membership. Korsgaard’s analysis may offer an answer. According to Card: 
[k]indness and respect are not morally good if they are based not on the humanity of their 
recipients but on the recipients’ membership in a more limited group. Yet behavior shares 
features with moral behavior that distinguish it from mere prudence: racist behavior can 
include self-sacrifice, for example. If the source of normativity is the conception of oneself 
as a member of a superior group who is free to treat outsiders in hostile ways,  the resulting 
norms are neither moral nor prudential.121 
The resulting norms do not have a clear category in ethical theories, but are known as racist, sexist, 
etc. To build on Korsgaard’s theories, Card turns to Lorna Smith Benjamin and IPIRs. 
 Benjamin theory of IPIRs, Important Persons and their Internalized Representations, comes 
from an extension of attachment theory. John Bowlby defines attachment behavior as “any form 
of behaviour that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to some other differentiated 
and preferred individual, who is usually conceived as stronger and/or wiser” and that such behavior 
in adults tends to be “especially evident when a person is distressed, ill, or afraid.”122 Benjamin 
argues that attachment to an important other person can explain otherwise irrational behavior. The 
internationalization of these important other persons, in Benjamin’s system, “can take the form of 
imitation (of the person’s treatment of others, such as oneself), recapitulation (of one’s early 
responses to the person), or introjection (treating oneself as the person used to treat one).”123 
According to Bowlby, children will often retain representations of important persons, such as 
caregivers, and use their relationships as models for evaluate their behavior towards others. 
Benjamin’s hypothesis is that there is a similar relationship with adults and models of behavior 
based on important persons, which she designates as the IPIRs. The IPIR approach takes us into 
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the minds of people to understand the behavior from the agent’s perspective, and to see if their 
behavior can be understood as a pattern of responses or reenactments of the behavior of IPIRs. 
 Card believes that this approach to understanding behavior and motivations can have 
implications for theories of moral change, as we understand that norms and values are implicit in 
the behavior patterns of IPIRs we seek to imitate, recapitulate, or introject. If the IPIRs that 
individuals are attached to are cruel, then it stands to reason that said individuals will tend to act 
cruelly, if they act unreflexively and do not have a strong good will. Even if they do self-reflect to 
some extent, this will still hold because said individuals will not only have behavior patterns based 
on their cruel IPIRs, but they will seek the admiration and esteem of someone who is cruel. The 
path towards moral change, according to the theory of IPIRs, is to either deliberately act in a 
behavior different from that of the cruel IPIRs or to lessen one’s attachment to cruel IPIRs. In this 
way, our initial inclinations may be cruel and we may be said to not be in control of behavior 
inasmuch as our IPIRs were determined by our caregivers and their behavior, but people are 
morally culpable insofar as they fail to reflect on the morality of their IPIRs and choose not to 
adjust themselves if their IPIRs are immoral. 
Concluding, Card states that “[e]ver since Thomas Hobbes set the tone, modern Western 
philosophers have expended much energy either advocating egoism or else defending morality 
against it... Affiliation is what has been presumed to require explanation, not self-interest. In 
attachment theory, the presumption seems to be the reverse... Attachment precedes self-interest, 
even any sense of self.”124 With Korsgaard’s and Benjamin’s theories, Card presents an updated 
theory of Kant’s radical evil. By subverting morality to principles which derive from practical 
identities, that are themselves informed by our IPIRs, people may act in a radically evil way 
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without having subverted morality to prudence. Kant specifies that we have an imperfect duty to 
ourselves to self-improve because we self-improvement means that we as moral agents are more 
likely to fight evil temptations, and to adhere to the good will, towards which we have a perfect 
duty. Even if people fall to weakness or mixed motivations, where the principles derive from our 
practical identity instead of morality, people could greater perfect themselves by ensuring that the 
IPIRs from which self-conceptions derive are morally righteous IPIRs. 
 In evaluating Card’s theories of evil and the psychological motivations to do evil, we can 
see a compatibility with the ideas of Rousseau (and Descartes) as presented in the first section, on 
the social contract. Rousseau believes that humans are born good, and society corrupts them. Kant 
believes that people are capable of acting from the good will, and that diabolical vices are not from 
nature, but from social competition and the scarcity of goods. Additionally, the principles of self-
management and self-improvement are evident in Kant’s belief in perfectibility and that people 
are capable of changing their IPIRs, thereby further proving the Cartesian model over the 
Hobbesian model of human nature.  
Furthermore, we can see in the diabolical vices and IPIRs why people commit genocide. 
The desire for hateful superiority over others, the anxiety of social competition, and the fear of 
loss of goods and security lead people to act against what morality prescribes. Contentious politics 
creates the environments where diabolical vices can find root. When conflict does arise, the IPIRs 
that people subconsciously look to are less likely to have mercy and compassion as their guiding 
principles, but instead cruelty and malice. In conflict, people valorize those who are willing to do 
violence for the sake of their group. Self-defense is of course recognized as a legitimate motivation 
for violence, but the problem is that groups will extend their believed defense interests beyond 
what is recognized as actual self-defense. The social group in a position of power may often 
51 
 
perceive threats to their privileged position as threats to their fundamental interests instead of 
threats to a system which creates positions of privilege. This is because victimhood (or at least a 
sense of victimhood) has nothing to do with one’s initial position in society.  
According to Daniel Bar-Tal, et. al., “[a] sense of collective victimhood is unrelated to the 
strength and power of the collectives involved in intractable conflict. Collectives that are strong 
and powerful militarily, politically and economically still perceive themselves as victims or 
potential victims in the conflict. The self-assigned status as the victim does not necessarily indicate 
weakness.”125 This is what happened with America in the Vietnam War, Israelis in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, the Turks in their conflict with the Kurds, and more. Victimhood is important 
for after conflicts, as well. According to Peskin:  
being designated as a victim is a source of political strength for governments. Victim status 
can confer global recognition of a nation’s suffering and legitimacy to the government in 
power. This in turn may lead to increased aid and support for the new regime... For 
governments, the writing of this narrative plays a key role in maintaining their domestic 
and international legitimacy and in turn solidifying their grip on power.126  
So we can see the importance of the perceived status of victimhood in not just legitimating the use 
of power, but in holding the power as well. So in answering the question, why would someone 
commit genocide, we can start from the question, “what would most people be willing to do or 
support if they believed that their social group was a victim, regardless of whether or not they 
actually were victims?” The answer to this question for many people is unrestrained violence, 
especially when the perceived victimizer is no longer, or never was, seen as a party to the social 
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6. The Social Contract Under Transitional Justice  
Before we can understand the social contract under transitional justice, it is first important 
to answer the question, when did transitional justice begin? The field of transitional justice as a 
field of legal scholarship began in the 1990s.127 The aftermath of WWII is generally considered 
the source of the first transitional justice mechanisms — the war criminals tribunals in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo. The prosecution of Nazi and Imperial Japanese officials is certainly one of the most 
famous, although Bass identifies earlier possible claimaints to the title. Bass points to ultimately 
botched war crimes trials in Constantinople, in 1919, to prosecute Turkish officials for crimes 
against the Armenians and the trials in Leipzig, two years later, against the German high command 
for war crimes against Allied troops.128 Going back even further, there were trials of a sort that 
may have served as some inspiration for the post-WWI forces — the exiling of Napoleon to St. 
Helena in 1815. Done absent any legal pretensions, the act was the first of its kind. Victor’s justice 
had always existed, and in another universe Napoleon may have gotten the gallows (or the 
guillotine), but the forces of the Seventh Coalition decided to punish Bonaparte and his 
accomplices for the ‘crime’ of aggression. Realistically, the arresting and exiling of these figures 
was done to both satisfy France’s former enemies, but also to better secure the Bourbon restoration. 
Herein we can see the kernel of transitional justice which I believe is key to understanding its 
social contract: securing the legitimacy and existence of the ruling regime.  
I argue that we could go back even further to find examples of transitional justice. Perhaps 
the first is the trial and execution of King Charles I of England. With the Grand Remonstrance, a 
list of grievances drawn up by Parliament and presented to Charles before the English Civil War, 
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the trials for treason at the tribunal established by the Parliament and the New Model Army, and 
the performance of the punishment for the guilty verdict (death), we have both a justice mechanism 
during a period of transition from a less liberal government (King Charles I ruling by fiat, having 
dissolved Parliament) to a more liberal government (although illiberal by today’s standard). It may 
have been victor’s justice, but it cannot be said that Charles failed to provide ample reasons for 
retribution.129 Additionally, after the Stuart Restoration in 1660, King Charles II faced the question 
of what to do to those who had executed his father. Believing that forgiveness would better fit the 
political environment, Charles II offered a general pardon for all who conspired against Charles 
I.130 
I also consider the trial and execution of King Louis XVI of France as a transitional justice 
mechanism. Compared to the trial of Charles I, the list of charges against Louis XVI were much 
more numerous and expansive, to include actions taken by Louis to suppress the beginnings of the 
revolution. What is interesting is how often deputies of the Convention referenced Rousseau 
during their deliberations over what to do with Louis XVI. Of all philosophers, Rousseau is 
brought up 47 times, more than all other thinkers or scholars combined.131 Although the terror that 
followed may have been terrible, it is unarguable that the revolution which overthrew King Louis 
XVI led to a more a liberal government. If regicide seems hardly to qualify as transitional justice, 
then the aftermath of the victory of Haitian forces in their revolution may seem a better fit.  
After having secured the island and promulgated a new constitution, the second only in the 
world, President Dessalines ordered, in February of 1804, trials for those accused of participating 
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in massacres committed by General Leclerc and General Rochambeau.132 Additionally, 
Dessalines, “convened a commission to investigate atrocities committed by the French. Mostly 
this was focused on specific acts committed during the recent occupation by Leclerc and 
Rochambeau, but it was also interested in compiling a general list of crimes, going back into the 
days of the old slave regime.”133 According to Mike Duncan, the purpose of the commission was 
not to aid in the prosecutions of the accused participants in these massacres, but rather to establish 
the collective guilt of the white French population as a whole. The pretext, then, of the commission 
and the trials was to justify the killing of most of the remaining white French in Haiti. President 
Dessalines personally supervised many of the killings, in tours of cities throughout Haiti. Only 
some white widows and children were spared, along with Polish soldiers who had gone AWOL 
instead of fighting the Haitians, and Germans who had been given permission to live in Haiti prior 
to the massacres.134 In Haiti, although the revolutionaries traded a new Republic for a self-
proclaimed President turned Emperor, it seems inarguable that ending slavery meant that the 
transition was towards a more liberal society. 
What all of these examples have in common is that they are examples of transitional justice, 
of a sort, that took place around the time of the creation of the social contract as a concept. Hobbes’ 
Leviathan was written at the same time as the English Civil War and was published only two years 
after the execution of Charles. Rousseau was alive for the events that preceded the French 
Revolution — he was even invited to help write the constitution for Corsica after their revolution 
against the Republic of Genoa.135 Kant lived through the French Revolution and wrote about it as 
well. So we should understand that the relationship between the social contract and periods of 
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transition is that the social contract must be viewed through the emergence from the state of nature 
during a transitional period. The periods of transition in today’s age should not be seen as separate 
from the past times in European and American history, but as analogous. The only difference 
between the two periods is the timing of the arrival of capitalism and nationalism. I believe that 
these forces are what propel the social change leading to a new social contract — the Social 
Contract.  
If the social contract of (current) transitional justice is no different from the social contract 
of the past revolutionary times, then we can understand the aims of current transitional justice 
mechanisms as playing an analogous role to the trials and commissions of  the past. The purpose 
of transitional justice is the securing and entrenching of power by and for the ruling class. As 
Rousseau argues, the purpose of the emergence from the state of nature (in the broad sense) into 
the state of society by the creation of the social contract is to preserve the unequal distribution of 
resources and power. Transitional justice mechanisms are used to preserve the power of the ruling 
class in a number of ways. To be clear, there are few situations where transitional justice 
mechanisms are deployed to hold the current ruling class accountable, but rather the former ruling 
class by the new ruling class. Where the ruling class has not changed during transitions, amnesties 
are the order of the day.  
In the case of international tribunals, there is the straightforward argument in favor of them 
for the ruling class in a country that trials can be used to quite literally get rid of the opposition. 
This was the case in the former Yugoslav countries. In what is today Serbia (but at the time was 
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the arrest of Slobodan Milošević only happened 
after he and his party lost an election. The new president wanted to get rid of a powerful political 
opponent, as well as end international sanctions and later join the EU, so his government permitted 
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the arrest and transfer of Milošević to the ICTY. 136 Similar circumstances played out in Croatia 
with former President Franjo Tuđman, as well. Paul Kagame, current President of Rwanda, faced 
different circumstances than in the Balkan countries. The RPF’s rule was much more secure after 
the end of the Rwandan genocide. Peace had not been negotiated, like with the Dayton Agreement 
in the former Yugoslavia, but had been obtained through blood and sacrifice. As such, there was 
less of a need to get rid of any opposition politicians who had been complicit in the killings. This 
is, for one reason, why the ICTR was in Arusha and not The Hague, like the ICTY. It’s also why 
the scope of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction only covers the Rwandan genocide, and does not 
extend earlier to include crimes committed in 1990-1993, which may have implicated the RPF. 
Kagame had a stronger hand to play in negotiations with the international community. 
International trials had another important aspect, which is why Rwanda ultimately complied with 
ICTR requests: the benefits of the status of victimhood. 
 As I discuss in the previous section, the status of victimhood is very important for the 
obtaining and maintenance of power. Trials allow for the promulgation of victimhood status, and 
international trials do this on the international stage. Moreover, the recognition of victimhood at 
the international stage can be used in domestic politics. Because the ICTR was limited to 
prosecuting crimes that had only happened in 1994, Kagame has been able to create a narrative 
about the causes of the genocide, and thereby minimize the culpability of the RPF. In doing so, he 
is trying to reconstruct the collective memory of the events, and thereby strengthening the power 
of the RPF, the ruling party in Rwanda.137 It is for this reason that people such as Janine Clark, as 
I discuss in the second section, is critical of the NURC and the unity process.  
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Truth and reconciliation commissions can function in a similar way to trials, in the 
construction of collective memories. In some instances, truth commissions are used to address 
grassroots demands without actually permitting fuller accounts of culpability by limiting the 
permitted scope of analysis.138 This is often achieved by focusing on particular facts and events 
and removing the context or normative judgments about those facts. Audrey R. Chapman and 
Patrick Ball refer to these as ‘micro-truths’ and ‘macro-truths,’ where the latter is far more 
important for framing a narrative for a population.139 The good news is that if a new government 
is representative and responsive to its population, then the transitional justice mechanism is in a 
way a positive development, as it reinforces the power of a responsive government.  
Another transitional justice mechanism that is used to preserve the power of the ruling class 
is lustration. In this case, there is some dispute over the ruling class, with the newer contender 
being ascendent. Lustration can achieve, among other things, “the reorganization and revitalization 
of the state’s administrative organs; the imposition of economic and social penalties on the old 
regime’s functionaries; and the overall circulation of elites, which provides employment 
opportunities for the new regimes supporters.”140 Here we can clearly see the prizes of being a 
member of the ruling class’ cohort. As I discuss in the previous section, there is resource and 
opportunity hoarding, as government jobs can be highly sought after.  
Lastly, amnesties may be necessary for a new government to maintain power while it is 
still weak, and the previous ruling elites still retain a good amount of power. Here, the transitional 
justice mechanism is chosen as a necessity, if it can be said to be a choice. Some, such as Calhoun, 
argue that amnesty may not be a mere necessary evil, but vital for the creation of a new social 
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contract. Calhoun argues “[t]he promise of future obedience is sufficient atonement for all the past 
crimes. The injustices of the past can have no practical or moral relevance under the social 
contract.”141 Leniency towards strongmen is necessary to achieve full participation in the process 
of contracting a new society. Calhoun goes so far as to argue that illiberal or anti-democratic parties 
ought not be excluded, as “[a]ll views are welcome in a democracy,”142 although she does give 
exceptions, such as the exclusion of Nazis in Germany. 
What, then, is the social contract under transitional justice? It is the same social contract as 
the contract of Haiti, the United States, and France, which is to say a contract of inequality and 
domination. The only difference is the existence of a scholarly enterprise to study and legitimize 
certain social practices. The more interesting subject is how the modern social contract differs 
from previous social contract. As I argue in section 1, new social contracts come from the 
emergence from the broad state of nature, and they may come from the state of nature of war and 
anarchy or the state of nature under tyrannical governments which do not respect civil and political 
rights. Previous social contracts were limited in their reach. They were between the sovereign and 
the nobility, and then contracts between nobles and their serfs, or later subjects. There were no 
citizens, only rulers and the ruled. As Benno Teschke argues, international relations can be 
understood through the lens of social property relations.143 Monarchs had a social property relation 
with their realm. They owned the land, and the subjects simply inhabited the land. The feudal 
social contract was defined by such terms. The modern social contract is different inasmuch as 
relationship is framed by a social property relationship of the nation and the state. The nation — 
the people — own the land. The state is then created to arbitrate disputes within the nation. From 
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this we can see why genocides happen. One group of people imagines themselves as a nation, for 
which there is some plot of land which they own. If there are people on that land that are not a part 
of the nation, then they are not a party to their social contract, and can justifiably (in the minds of 
some) be removed from the land. Transitional justice, if it is achieving anything related to the 




7. A Third State of Nature 
Lastly, I believe that there may be what we could think of as a third state of nature. As I 
discuss in section 1, Rousseau believes that there are two states of nature. There is a state of nature 
in “its purity, and [the second state of nature] is the fruit of an excess of corruption.”144 In these 
two states of nature, people’s rights are unprotected and the rule of the strongest dominates. In the 
original state of nature it is because political authority has not been established, and in the second 
state of nature it is because the government is tyrannical and people’s rights are subject to the 
whims of individuals. From both there is a violent break to enter, or return to, a new state of society 
through a new social contract. I believe that we can imagine a third state of nature, but one far less 
violent than the second state of nature, and the emergence from it is far better. This third state of 
nature is not a state of nature in the traditional sense, or even perhaps on the broadest of 
interpretations. It is probably best understood as a simulacrum of the state of nature. There is still 
established political authority and a high level of sociability, but governments may not be secure 
when faced with sustained civil disobedience marshalled by social movements. As such, a third 
state of nature is brought about by social movements engaged in civil disobedience and other forms 
of contentious politics so as to achieve radical changes in society, which we can imagine as living 
under a new social contract. To understand how this works, we need to understand how social 
movements are able to achieve moral progress.      
Turning to Elizabeth Anderson, she expands on Tilly’s theories of social movements and 
contentious politics to address moral progress. She begins with John Dewey’s theory of moral 
pragmatism.145 According to Dewey, the interdependence of human beings — the necessity of 
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assistance, coordination, and cooperation among people — requires the institution of rules of 
conduct to regulate and order human activity. The creation and dissemination of social 
conventions, traditions, norms, etc. provides for a level of predictability beyond that which ad hoc 
agreements could offer. Norms are accepted and reproduced so long as they effectively structure 
its relevant group.146 
What makes moral norms distinct from social norms generally is that: a. moral norms 
purport to carry the force of authoritative command b. conformity may be exacted from members 
of the community c. authority of moral commands does not depend on any immediate or direct 
good and d. shared moral expectations are colored by shared emotional dispositions. Compliance 
with moral norms is expected regardless of what others do; if people believed that it was acceptable 
to ignore obligations generated by some norm when it is ignored by others, such a norm could not 
be understood as a moral norm. When two or more moral claims come into conflict, and the 
precedent or applicability of particular moral norms is disputed, people appeal to higher order 
moral principles to adjudicate between said interpersonal claims.147 
The application of higher order moral principles, as a social practice, is reflective, and the 
structure of values and norms is subject to change. The impetus for change can arise from a few 
situations: a. uncertainty over how accepted moral principles apply to particular conflicts b. the 
application of a principle may produce new undesirable outcomes, or the previously undesirable 
outcomes could be newly discovered and/or c. people may “challenge the legitimacy of a 
customary norm or principle, by drawing attention to objectionable features of its operation and 
failures in its purported justification.”148 Under any of these circumstances, moral norms or 
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principles may require revision, or even replacement. On the pragmatist account, the failure of a 
norm/principle to properly regulate and order social activity provides the reason for modifying or 
abandoning said norm/principle. Rules, of any kind, exist so that the collective compliance yields 
benefits for everyone above that which could be obtained absent those rules. The intended outcome 
may or may not be known by the participating members — uncritical acquiescence may often 
suffice. When, though, there is a disagreement or uncertainty about the efficacy or legitimacy of a 
norm/principle, people are forced to consciously reflect on what the desired outcome actually is, 
and whether it actually is desirable. Moral reflection is only rendered necessary when the normal, 
habitual application of moral norms fails in one of the aforementioned ways.  
Moral reflection over norms and principles is not an isolated, individual activity. Since 
norms and principles exist only insofar as members of groups reproduce and abide by them, 
changing them requires collective action. When it comes to moral norms in particular, social 
movements play an important role in achieving moral progress through the bias correction of the 
powerful. By bias, Anderson does not (exclusively) mean partial preferences or selfishness; rather, 
the bias which social movements correct is an epistemological bias. Powerful elites, just like 
everyone, view the world through their own limited perspective. We could understand this as 
constituting part of the epistemological contract. The perspective of the powerful is limited in two 
ways that are inherent to their social standing: arrogance and ignorance. The powerful are arrogant 
when they perceive criticisms from below as merely vicious, or covetous. The powerful are 
ignorant because their social standing does not place them in the material conditions of those below 
them, and, therefore, cannot understand their interests. To overcome the epistemological problem, 
social movements must: a. inform the powerful of the interests and needs of the oppressed b. 
express what is needed to respect these interests as claims to change their conduct and to subject 
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them to moral criticism and c. display their moral worthiness so as to seize the claim of moral 
authority.149  
The epistemological problem is not one that can be addressed by argumentation, alone. For 
one, mere moral arguments are divorced from social practice, thus necessitating no practical 
deliberation. Any conclusions arrived at in discussion, or principles enumerated, are taken as 
hypotheticals and do not need to be acted upon by those a party to the discussion. After all, how 
often do people find themselves confronted with a lever, trolley car tracks, and hogtied hostages? 
Moreover, “practically realized moral norms are entrenched in largely unreflective habits which 
are sustained by shared expectations of people’s duties and entitlements.”150 It is not inconsistent 
to suppose an individual who changes their mind in a moral argument over some issue, and to then, 
later, revert back to their previously held belief. It requires no self-deception, intellectual 
dishonesty, or bad faith engagement.  In order to make meaningful, sustainable moral progress, 
arguments need to be paired with action, particularly through contentious politics, so that practical 
reasoning is engaged with as well as moral reasoning.  
Furthermore, we might think of pairing arguments with action as a form of contracting or 
consenting (or withholding consent) with the government. The epistemological problem can be 
understood through the lens of the epistemological contract, as the contract defines who is a party 
to the social contract and their prescribed roles. The disjunction in society over what should be 
universally recognized moral norms, then, requires a new consensus over cognitive norms. Social 
action, or what Mezzera, et. al. refer to as bargaining, articulating, and mediating with the state, is 
required to form the conesus that the epistemological contract requires.  
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Social movements engage with people’s moral and practical reasoning by producing an 
epistemic break in the minds of the ruling class and its supporters. By epistemic break, I mean a 
precipitous shift in belief caused by an action or event that forced significant reflection. Social 
movements produce the conditions necessary for epistemic breaks by openly defying social norms. 
Protests, sit-ins, mass demonstrations, etc. disrupt people’s sense of normalcy. People are then 
forced to think about the impetus for public disruption, which then induces practical reasoning 
about why the current norms have failed and possible alternative norms. When confronted with 
‘effective contention,’ practical deliberation over alternatives is triggered in three ways. First, as 
public opposition to norm compliance grows, popular support for such norms will decline. Second, 
dwindling support for a norm may undermine its ability to adjudicate interpersonal conflicts, i.e. 
the reason for its existence. Third, stubborn adherence to a contested norm can impose a moral 
cost upon the powerful, and undermine its moral authority.151 
The legitimacy of the ruling class is contingent upon the source of its authority. Under 
divine right, a ruler must appear pious. Under absolutism, a ruler must demonstrate lineage. Under 
democracy (or, more specifically, a democratic republic), the state must be seen as representative 
of the citizens. In a democracy, the state, by creating and enforcing laws, makes its members 
subject to the same coercively imposed rules that no one can alter by acting on her own and 
imposing such terms in the name of said members. Idealized, each citizen is both ruler of and ruled 
by her fellow citizens. Such is the basis of the modern social contract and the idea of the consent 
of the governed. The moral authority of the powerful elites derives from their ability to claim that 
society, under their rule, is governed justly; in a democratic society, justice is measured by whether 
its laws are ones which ideal citizens would choose for themselves. If a society’s legal institutions 
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produce unpopular, harmful outcomes, then its laws are no longer acceptable, or just. Social 
movements convey dissatisfaction with the status quo.   
Returning to Tilly’s argument that social movements offer displays of worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment, Anderson outlines the necessity of these components for achieving 
moral progress. All four components constitute conditions for collective self-presentation. As 
summarized by Tilly:  
Worthiness: sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and mothers 
with children.  
Unity: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and 
chanting.  
Numbers: headcounts, filling streets. signatures on petitions, messages from constituents,  
Commitment: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and handicapped; 
resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction.152 
Anderson argues that these four features are necessary for social movements to address the moral 
biases of powerful elites. By displaying worthiness and commitment, social movements dispel the 
arrogant bias that activists are selfish or vicious. Unity compels a level of internal agreement 
necessary for attracting others to a movement. Numbers convey the scale of popular support for a 
movement’s platform, as well as undermine perceived support for existing social norms.153  
With the biases of the powerful addressed, the moral arguments of social movements have 
a real opportunity for consideration and uptake. One approach to understanding how displays are 
able to create epistemic breaks is affect control theory. According to affect control theory, people’s 
understanding of the world around them is regulated, in part, by their affective reaction to objects 
and events around them. The topography of social life, and everything in it, is imbued with an 
affective meaning. Affective meaning is the content of a symbolic attachment, an object that is 
associated with affect and the definition of content is collectively shared by members within a 
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society. People are motivated to maintain these affective meanings by perpetuating its meaning 
and policing deviations from commonly accepted definitions. Emotions act as signals to convey 
whether situations and events helped maintain people’s self-conceptions and self-identity 
meanings. As signals, emotions facilitate both people’s anticipation of future (re)actions and the 
ability to convey to others our own beliefs and opinions.154 
 The reason that people strive to maintain affective meanings is two fold. Foremost, 
affective meanings are necessary for helping people to understand the world around them and to 
orient themselves accordingly. If an object lost its affective meaning, then it would become 
difficult for people to effectively anticipate the future reactions of others because there is no longer 
a collective shared understanding of that object. Stable (structures of) affective meanings, more 
generally, help people control their own emotions, dispositions, mood, etc. Entering a world filled 
with unclear affective meanings (or devoid of familiar meanings) would be disorienting, even 
physically uncomforting. At a small, limited scale, the motive to maintain affective meanings is 
functional — at a macroscopic level, the motivation becomes continued confidence in one’s ability 
to accurately perceive reality. People can also be motivated to maintain affective meanings when 
the meanings help explicate larger political, economic, and cultural structures; these structures 
place individuals in roles relative to others and color social expectations, thereby establishing 
hierarchies. Changes to certain affective meanings could alter how people understood the social 
hierarchy; for those in privileged positions in society, maintaining affective meanings may be 
necessary for maintaining their position within the social hierarchy. In this way, we can see how 
the epistemological contract plays an important role: it helps define the privileges of certain social 
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relations. Social movements achieve moral progress by both achieving tangible political 
victories/policy schemes and changing social/moral norms.155  
 Applying affect control theory to social movements, displays of emotions are a necessary 
part of inducing practical reasoning and substantiating moral arguments. Passionate displays of 
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment underscore a social movement’s platform by 
conveying the failure of powerful elites to uphold conditions necessary for maintaining self-
conceptions. These displays achieve a level of cognitive uptake unobtainable through moral 
argumentation. This is because moral arguments — the act of doing it, through (in)formal 
institutions — are explicitly structured to only include arguments based on ‘logic and reason’ and 
to only use ‘fact-based’ or quantitative evidence. In academia and elsewhere, appeals to emotion, 
anecdotes, and narrative structures are dismissed as insufficient evidence. Whatever 
epistemological or ontological views one may have, it is an undeniable fact that the majority of 
people can find emotional/narrative arguments convincing, and can be skeptical of mathematical 
or logically complex arguments. Emotions convey people’s affective relationship with the world, 
and this is necessary for overcoming the arrogant and ignorant biases of powerful elites. 
The reason social movements are able to induce practical reasoning among citizens about 
social norms not only because emotional displays supplement moral argumentation — social 
movements’ actions offend individuals’ moderate sensibilities by challenging, and violating, social 
norms. There is no such thing as a convenient place to march or convenient time to go on strike. 
Successful social movements are successful because they are able to mobilize sufficient numbers 
of protesters to disrupt the daily lives of a large enough population. It is, of course, not socially 
acceptable to sit in the middle of the street; when enough people get together to block entire 
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highways, it makes people upset. But in disrupting their affect control by upsetting people, social 
movements compel people to think about what would lead a large, unified number of worthy, 
committed people to violate social norms. When a social movement becomes large enough, 
popular support for contested norms fails to lead to shared acceptance and acquiescence, meaning 
the affective meaning is lost. If a social movement is successful, then it will have presented new 
social norms/affective meanings ready to replace the old norms/meanings, and people will have 
accepted and internalized them.  
During a social movement’s campaign, there comes a point where public discontent with 
and rejection of current norms is enough to undermine the existence of affective meaning, but the 
platform of new norms/meanings has not yet been widely accepted. In this limbo, some moderates 
will deny the need for change and argue in the status quo’s defense, while others will proffer 
incremental, concrete changes that maintain the overall material and ideological framework. 
Others will recognize the inadequacy of the status quo’s social norms to regulate society, but reject 
the social movement’s platform for new norms. Given a social movement’s unity, there generally 
will not be significant internal disagreements about the fundamental tenets of the platform. Petty 
squabbling, factionalism, and the narcissism of small differences can lead to organizational splits. 
This, however, does not entail a fracture of the social movement; social movements are not clearly 
structured organization, but rather informal, social entities. Rival, competing groups are still a part 
of the same social movement because they are working for the same platform, even if the work is 
not done together. How does this apply to the social contract? 
Social movements achieve a third state of nature through civil disobedience by suspending 
people’s beliefs in the regulatory power of moral norms and disrupting affective meanings. Mass 
acts of civil disobedience disrupt people’s faith that they live in a well-ordered society. If people 
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believed that they lived a morally just society, they would have no reason to mass protest or endure 
police brutality or block roads and bridges and stage sit-ins at dinners. Because of civil 
disobedience, people who believe themselves to be ethical individuals are faced with the question, 
“is there something wrong with our society, and if so, what can I do to change it?” Because there 
is a suspension of belief in the regulatory power of moral norms/meanings, people are forced to 
examine what the principles society is based upon, and whether they ought to be changed. 
Successful social movements are able to radically change not only institutions of power, but the 
very moral conceptions that everyday people have about what is good and bad. Because of this 
transformational power, social movements push society into a third state of nature, and thereby 
force a new social contract to be written to govern society. As I state at the beginning of this 
section, this third state of nature is not a state of nature in the traditional sense. But I refer to this 
situation as a state of nature so as to convey what conditions are necessary for the creations of a 
new social contract.  
We can also think of the act of engaging in a social movement as taking a similar place as 
the act of creating a social contract. As Anderson argues, moral argumentation and moral reasoning 
is not enough to produce changes in people’s moral beliefs. In order to produce the type of 
reflection necessary for actual change you must engage in practical reasoning, which is only 
activated when thought is paired with practice. As Hobbes argues, laws of natures are preceptes or 
general rules that are found out by reason.156 So, if social contracts are supposed to enshrine natural 
laws into civil constitutions, then it can only be done when parties to the contract know the content 
of natural laws. The powerful elites of course have their own beliefs, and we might say that they 
actually have no intention of actually bringing natural laws into civil society because they just 
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want to perpetrate a ruse against the poor. But, insofar as citizens believe that their society operates 
on the consent of the governed and that their moral and political principles derive from natural 
laws, then we must consider the act of engaging in practical reasoning so as to change the 
foundational principles of society as an act of rewriting the social contract. As such, the purpose 
of social movements is to demonstrate that their government does not, in fact, operate with the 
consent of the governed. 
 Looking to countries undergoing transitional justice, I believe we can see what represents 
the failure of social movements. Social movements are successful when they are (mostly) non-
violent. But when people are unable to petition their grievances in a peaceful manner, some people 
will inevitably turn to violence. This mobilization in turn spurs a counter-mobilization, and leads 
to violent contentious politics. From there, the situation can either escalate further, or the 
government could accede to demands for reform. This very scenario is what led to the Troubles in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom.157 In 1968, peaceful Catholic protesters in Northern Ireland 
marched for changes to the voting laws, and for other reforms. They were met with violent 
crackdowns by police. In 1969, loyalist mobs began attacking the Catholic protesters. Starting 
April, loyalists went so far as to plant bombs at electrical plants and water refinement centers so 
that the IRA would be blamed for it.158 Protests later devolved into riots. In August, a particularly 
bad riot broke out. By October of the same year, loyalists shot and killed an Irish police officer, 
and the Troubles began. The peaceful protests of a social movement provoked a rage in the hearts 
of loyalists, so instead of seeing their government concede reforms to the protestors, they met non-
violence with violence.   
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The violence of the Troubles led to what Mezzera, et. al. calls ‘conflict-affected countries’ 
(or regions). In Northern Ireland you had non-state actors and informal institutions performing 
tasks that normally were performed by the state. In such a situation, society (and really there were 
almost two separate societies that co-habitated, between the Catholics and Protestants) devolved 
in a way into a state of nature. There was some political authority, but it was constantly being 
challenged, undermined, or even outright ignored. The Troubles was a war, in the sense that we 
would consider a state of nature on the broad interpretation. As Hobbes argues, “so the nature of 
war consisteth not in the actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time 
there is no assurance to the contrary.”159 The war may not have been ‘hot’ the entire time, but the 
possibility of a car bombing or assassination or ambush always laid around the corner.  
Looking beyond Northern Ireland, we can see other situations where societies are close to 
a state of nature, and societies undergoing transitions are faced with similar situations. Countries 
faced with high degrees of social contradictions and conflicting material interests are then 
vulnerable to falling into a state of nature. It may be the first state of nature where different factions 
fight each other, it may be the second state of nature where the government suspends the rule of 
law and brutally represses its people to avoid unrest or revolution, or it could be a third state of 
nature where social movements upend society in a mostly non-violent way. In all three situations, 
there will be a return to a state governed by a social contract. Wars eventually end in either defeat 
for one side or a negotiated peace; repressions either fail and the government is toppled or succeed 
and dissidents are routed; and social movements are either successfully repressed, break into war, 
or succeed in not only securing changes to the material framework of society but also change 
people’s conceptions of what constitutes a morally just society. When there is success, there is a 
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new social contract, and we could understand this period as one of transitional justice. When there 
is failure to change a regime, the old contract is reinstituted, or circumscribed, and there is no 
transitional justice. By understanding social movements as vehicles for (relatively) peacefully 
returning a society to a state of nature, thereby allowing for a new social contract to be written, we 
can see how societies could be changed without genocide or war or revolution, and the 
international community can implement policies to support the creation of social movements 
throughout the world. Moreover, in countries that have undergone violence and now transitional 
justice, it should be clear that the international community should support the conditions necessary 
for social movements and transitional justice mechanisms should be understood as contributing to 
this framework, because the continued success of transitional justice requires that governments 
respond to the demands of its citizens. In this way, we can see how social contract theory and 
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